Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The Struggle for the Right to Housing by Hohmann, Jessie M.
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal
Volume 13
Issue 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal Article 2
2010
Visions of Social Transformation and the
Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The
Struggle for the Right to Housing
Jessie M. Hohmann
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Human Rights and Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessie M. Hohmann, Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The Struggle for the Right to
Housing, 13 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol13/iss1/2
Article
Visions of Social Transformation and the
Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The
Struggle for the Right to Housing
Jessie M. Hohmannt
The struggle for access to and control over a space in which to live has
made housing a central issue for the city of Mumbai. The city's history is
one in which human rights and, in particular, the right to housing have
played an important role. This article examines the Indian Supreme
Court's development of the right to housing as an aspect of the right to
life, placing this unique jurisprudence within the complex reality of life
for Mumbai's inhabitants. The article traces the growth of this expansive
human right through the Indian jurisprudence and then contrasts the
housing rights case law with more recent litigation on the environment,
urban growth, and rural development, in which the housing rights of
marginalized communities have been radically refigured. The analysis
reveals competing visions of how human rights should be interpreted and
whose interests these norms should protect. In fact, as the article exposes,
the contested interpretation of the right to housing is caught up in
competing visions of India's social transformation into a new, "modern"
state and the place of its marginalized citizens within that state. In this
context, the right to housing emerges as a site of struggle through which
the meaning of urban citizenship, participation, and the future of the city
t British Academy Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law
& Junior Research Fellow, Darwin College, Cambridge. The author would like to express her
gratitude to Dr. Guglielmo Verdirame, Professor Susan Marks, and Dr. Daniel Joyce for their
comments on earlier incarnations of this article and to the inhabitants of Mumbai, for whom
this research is undertaken.
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itself are contested. The article closes by offering some conclusions on the
factors underlying the shift in popular and judicial human rights
discourse, showing that competing visions of social transformation have
had concrete impacts on the human rights of India's most marginalized
citizens.
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many cities across the world, Mumbai shares in the pressures,
pains, and pleasures of rapid urban growth. Mumbai's role as India's
financial capital makes it an attractive destination for migrants who seek
both to escape rural poverty and to remake their lives in a city of
opportunities. As its growing population has overwhelmed its
infrastructure, fifty to seventy-five percent of the city's inhabitants now
live in informal settlements or slums, where they are subject to dire
physical conditions and lack crucial legal protections. This struggle for
access to, and control over, a space in which to live has made housing a
central issue in Mumbai. Both despite and because of the city's housing
inadequacies, a strong housing rights movement' has developed in which
claims to the human right to housing have played a central part. The
resulting body of jurisprudence on the right to housing is analytically
distinct from other legal responses at the domestic, regional, and
international level, and the movement has fostered a strong rights
consciousness throughout society and a high level of activism around
housing and the social goods related to its enjoyment.
However, the struggle for housing in Mumbai is one in which
changing interpretations of human rights have played a major role.
Focusing on the Indian jurisprudence on the right to housing, this article
reveals how efforts to control physical space are caught up with divergent
visions of the future of Mumbai, and of India itself. In one vision, Mumbai
is cast in the image of a city in a socialist state, in which substantive
equality and social justice are achieved through the promotion of pro-poor
policies and the careful provision of basic goods to the marginalized. The
other, quite different, vision of Mumbai is as a "world class" city, the city
of the elite, participating freely in the global economy through private
1. This article refers to housing rights awareness, legal efforts to establish the right to
housing or shelter, and political mobilization on these and related issues as a "housing rights
movement." Though many observers would not recognize the situation as involving a
coherent or coordinated "movement," the cumulative effect of the political, legal and social
struggles can be best explained in this way. When analytically useful, the article will discard
the term "movement" in favor of more precise terminology. Likewise, the article does not use
the term "social movement" in a particular theoretical sense, but instead as a descriptive
umbrella term to refer to groups engaged in political, legal, or social action, thought, or
discourse, most often in opposition to the state. For a theoretical treatment of the concept of a
social movement, see Asef Bayat, Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the "Informal People", 18 THIRD
WORLD QUARTERLY 53, 57 (1997).
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initiative and entrepreneurialism, thus spurring economic growth and
development across India.
The role of housing in these contrasting futures emerges as
conspicuous and conflicting. On the one hand, housing is presented both as
a matter of basic physical need and as a right of urban citizenship. On the
other hand, planned housing development is envisaged as a tool of social
design for an aspirant society. As such, the struggles over housing in
Mumbai emerge not merely as matters of survival or material comfort, but
are invested with issues of belonging, entitlement, worth, and citizenship.
The article traces this complex web of competing visions, illustrating
the tensions between and among them, through the changing
interpretations of the right to housing in the Indian courts. First, the article
examines the cases on the right to housing, examining the development of
the distinctive human right to housing in India. Next, the article contrasts
the housing rights jurisprudence with more recent case law on the
environment, and urban and rural development. These more recent cases
re-characterize informal settlers as encroachers and polluters, and
represent a diminution in human rights protections for these citizens.
Third, the article critiques judicial participation in the State's changing
vision of its own role and the future of Mumbai in a modernizing India,
locating reasons for the changing discourse of human rights.
The article shows that, while human rights offer a powerful discursive
and political tool for the marginalized, these rights are subject to radical
reinterpretation in ways that can disempower, as well as empower. The
meaning of human rights is never finally settled, and these rights must be
claimed and reclaimed in any battle for just social change. The struggle to
control the right to housing in India illustrates the practical implications of
social, political, and legal conflicts for the control of human rights, and thus
contributes to an understanding of the role of contested human rights in
social change beyond, as well as within, India.
In Part II, the article outlines the housing conditions extant in the city
of Mumbai, drawing a complex picture of the political, social, and physical
terrain onto which the struggle for housing and space is mapped. In Part
III, the article situates the struggle for housing within the growth of a
housing rights movement in the city. Part IV then examines the judicial
protection of the right to housing through Indian Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Part V explores the legislative responses to this line of cases,
which include the concept of rehabilitation and compensation and the "cut-
off date." In Part VI, the article analyzes how the legal protections
guaranteed in the housing rights cases are being challenged by new
applications of human rights to the environmental movement, including
cases in which informal settlers and the poor are being re-characterized as
encroachers and polluters. VI.A examines the impact of the right to a clean
environment, VI.B focuses the analysis on rural development cases, and
VI.C considers the influence of the discourses on remaking Mumbai as a
"world class" city. Having traced these changing discourses, Part VII sets
out two reasons behind the radical shift in human rights discourse. The
2010] 137
3
Hohmann: Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The Struggle for the Right to Housing
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
concluding Part VIII offers some analysis of the impact of this changing
terrain for the realization of human rights in Mumbai.
II. MUMBAI: A CITY DEFINED BY HOUSING
In this section, the article contextualizes the housing situation in
Mumbai, elucidating the physical conditions which characterize life in the
city. This unique contextual background is crucial to an understanding of
the struggle for the right to housing in Mumbai, as this is the complex
physical, social, and political landscape on which the struggle for control of
human rights is played out.
Originally, the land on which the city of Mumbai now sits did not
exist. Several low-lying islands, the site of small fishing villages, reached
out from the mainland towards the sea.2 Under the control of colonial
powers, however, Mumbai began to grow as a metropolis, 3 taking in
Bombay and Salsette Islands, and then spreading out into a suburban area
on the mainland, simultaneously reclaiming land from the mangroves and
the sea.
As an important port and India's financial and trade capital,' Mumbai
has long been a lure for migrants. They are drawn to the city by its glitter
and possibility,' while crushing rural poverty pushes many to seek a new
life in the metropolis. 7 As a result, the "pace and sheer scale"' of
urbanization has overwhelmed Mumbai's infrastructure and its political
organs. The city,9 which occupies just over 400 square kilometers of land,"o
2. See Arjun Appadurai, Spectral Housing and Urban Cleansing: Notes on Millennial Mumbai,
12 PUB. CULTURE 627, 628 (2000).
3. Sujata Patel, Bombay/Mumbai: Globalization, Inequalities, and Politics, in WORLD CITIES
BEYOND THE WEST: GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY 238, 333 (Josef Gugler ed.,
2004).
4. See Greg O'Hare et al., A Review of Slum Housing Policies in Mumbai, 15 CITIES 269, 270
(1998).
5. Patel, supra note 3 at 328.
6. Here, as Sandeep Pendse writes, there is hope for "freedom to become an individuated
person and escape into a world of personal accomplishments and strivings," a freedom which
is represented by a modern India, where people are freed from the constraints of caste,
community, and duty. Sandeep Pendse, Toil, Sweat and the City, in BOMBAY: METAPHOR FOR
MODERN INDIA, 3, 12 (Sujata Patel & Alice Thorner eds., 1996).
7. See MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 171-72 (2006). In 1985, then Supreme Court Chief
Justice Chandrachud wrote of India's rural poor that "[tihe motive force which propels their
desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival .. . " Olga Tellis
v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 194.
8. CENTER ON HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS, WOMEN, SLUMS AND URBANIZATION:
EXAMINING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 10 (2008).
9. When referring to Mumbai, distinctions are often drawn between the city (Bombay
Island), Greater Mumbai (Salsette and Bombay Islands), and the Bombay Metropolitan Region
(which extends to the mainland areas). Jim Masselos notes the insufficiency of these
definitional boundaries and invokes the concept of the "effective city," which "is not
necessarily . . . that area delineated by finely calculated precise boundaries but that defined by
movement of ... people . . . ." Jim Masselos, Defining Moments/Defining Events: Commonalities
of Urban Life, in BOMBAY AND MUMBAI: THE CITY IN TRANSITION 31, 34 (Sujata Patel & Jim
Masselos eds., 2003). This self-identifying city is more accurate than officially established
boundaries, because it takes account of those who are literally marginalized through eviction,
[Vol. 13138
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has a population of some 18 million." Over half of the residents live in
informal settlements of one kind or another, including slum settlements,
run down and crumbling chawls,12 or the pavements themselves." There are
around 2500 individual slum settlements, which sit on just 6 percent of the
city's land but housed 5.5 to 6 million of its inhabitants in 2003." Almost 80
percent of the city's population live in substandard, inadequate and unsafe
housing,'- subject to an "ever-present threat of displacement.""
It is tempting to say Mumbai is a city defined by its slums, but the
word slum is misleading in two ways. First, as discussed in greater detail
below, not all of those who lack adequate housing in Mumbai live in slums
- there are other forms of informal or illegal settlement, and other
gradations of homelessness, that define the lives of Mumbai's inhabitants.
Second, the word slum connotes physical squalor, social dysfunction and
economic stagnation. 7 These stereotypes are often inappropriate to
describe the homes and neighborhoods of informal settlers in the city.
Mumbai's informal settlements are instead highly organized and energetic
communities. They are not only integral to the functioning of the city, but
contribute cultural, economic, and social vibrancy to it."
The largest group of the informally housed are generally referred to as
"slum dwellers." In common Mumbai usage, the word slum refers to a
settled area, inhabited by people who do not have formal ownership of the
land on which they live, and who have, without legal title, moved onto this
land and built their dwellings there." However, the legal definition of a
Mumbai slum is not tied to tenure or ownership, but instead to quality.
According to the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and
resettlement, or lack of available land or housing, who are pushed beyond definitional
boundaries, but who are by their very nature emblematic of Mumbai's population. This
article's use of the term Mumbai should be understood in this way.
10. Greater Mumbai covers 429.89 square kilometers. Patel, supra note 3, at 338.
11. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. & Soc. AFF., POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD URBANIZATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2005 REVISION 20, U.N. Doc ESA/P/WP/200 (October 2006).
12. Built to house mill workers in the 1920-1940s, chawls are one-room tenements that are
now increasingly overcrowded and dilapidated. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 279-80 (1998).
13. P.K. Das, Slums: The Continuing Struggle for Housing, in BOMBAY AND MUMBAI: THE
CITY IN TRANSITION 207, 210 (Sujata Patel & Jim Masselos eds., 2003).
14. Id. at 210.
15. Jan Nijman, Against the Odds: Slum Rehabilitation in Neoliberal Mumbai, 25 CITIES 73, 76
(2008).
16. Das, supra note 13, at 210.
17. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a slum as a "street, alley, court, etc., situated in
a crowded district of a town or city and inhabited by people of a low class or by the very
poor," as "a thickly populated neighborhood or district where the houses and the conditions
of life are of a squalid and wretched character," or as a "house materially unfit for human
habitation." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2009, http://www.oed.com/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2010). The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, meanwhile, describes a slum as "a densely populated
usually urban area marked by crowding, dirty run-down housing, poverty, and social
disorganization." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 2003, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
18. See, e.g., Vyjayanthi Rao, Slum as Theory: The South/Asian City and Globalization, 30
INT'L. J. OF URB. & REGIONAL RES. 225, 230 n.11 (2006); See also Dan McDougall, Waste Not Want
Not in the 700m Slum, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 4, 2007, at 38.
19. Usha Ramanathan, Demolition Drive, 32 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2908, 2908 (2005).
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Redevelopment) Act,'9 any building which is inadequately serviced,
unhygienic, dangerous, unfit for human habitation, overcrowded or unsafe
can be declared a slum.21 The act provides for "regularization" of various
slum areas, through "slum rehabilitation scheme[s]"." None of these
measures amount to the full legal protection provided to an owner,2 and
the appellation slum is still applied.
The conditions among slum settlements vary widely depending on a
myriad of factors. These include the religious, socio-economic, and caste
composition of the slum's population;24 the presence of powerful political25
- or organized criminal" - support; the existence of well-established
activist and NGO networks;" the physical and geographical location;" and
the length of continuous inhabitation or its "established" nature.' These
factors, along with the identity of the landowner," often determine the
level of services and utilities provided, and the relative security and
stability of the settlement.
However, even in the most prosperous and long-standing slums,
where the dwellings can consist of well-built concrete structures several
stories high," the living conditions are frequently appalling. This is due, in
part, to geographical location. Most of Mumbai's slums are built on the
most marginal lands: mangrove swamps, garbage hills, cemeteries, flood-
prone tidal flats, under high-tension power wires and on other lands "not
suitable for human habitation."" Lack of services, infrastructure and
facilities also contribute to the dire conditions in slum settlements.3 Most
inhabitants do not have access to toilets, clean water,' or safe disposal of
20. Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971,
No. 28, Government of Maharashtra, amended by Act, 2005, No. 24 [hereinafter Slum Areas Act].
21. Id. § 4.
22. Id. § 3B(1).
23. Minar Pimple & Lysa John, Security of Tenure: Mumbai's Experience, in HOLDING THEIR
GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 75, 75-83
(Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002).
24. The marginalized castes and tribal peoples live in poorer conditions than the rest of
Mumbai's population. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 271-72.
25. Nijman, supra note 15, at 78; see also Mumbai Demolitions get Sonia's Nod,
BUS.STANDARD (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/mumbai-demolitions-get-sonia%60s-nod/203094/.
26. Appadurai writes that "very often, control over these insecure spaces is in the hands
of semiorganized crime, where rent and extortion shade into one another." Supra note 2, at
637. In the context of water provision, Gandy notes that "water provision has ... been
increasingly linked with criminalized networks as part of an intensification of political
corruption in Mumbai." Matthew Gandy, Landscapes of Disaster: Water, Modernity and Urban
Fragmentation in Mumbai, 40 ENV. & PLAN. 108, 117 (2008).
27. Nijman, supra note 15, at 80.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. In particular, whether the land is government owned or in private hands. O'Hare et
al., supra note 4 at 275, 278.
31. Nijman, supra note 15, at 80.
32. Madhura Swaminathan, Aspects of Poverty and Living Standards, in BOMBAY AND
MUMBAL: THE CITY IN TRANSITION 81, 92 (Sujata Patel & Jim Masselos eds., 2003).
33. Patel, supra note 3, at 340.
34. Id.; Gandy, supra note 26, at 115, 118.
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wastes.'5 The "rudimentary" sewer system often fails to cope with the
monsoon rains, resulting in flooding and devastation of slum areas.'
Dwellings are crammed together with little ventilation or common space to
37allow fumes from cooking and home industries to escape.
Pavement dwellers are the second group of the informally-housed in
Mumbai. If the conditions in slums are bad, the conditions of pavement
dwellings are immeasurably worse.' While pavement dwellers are often
recent migrants to the city, they can also include families that have lived in
their dwellings for generations.3 9 Subject to successive waves of eviction,0
pavement dwellers have colonized the city's highway verges, footpaths,
roofs, railway easements, and other "interstitial spaces."" Here, they set up
homes that provide the barest shelter:
typically a small space enclosed on two sides by gunny sacks or
old saris and covered on top by sack-cloth, old sheets of plastic or,
occasionally, tarpaulin and held up by a few of wooden rods ...
The space available, around four feet by five feet, is just enough to
seat the four or five members of the household.4 2
Other pavement dwellers sleep in the open 3 These pavement dwellers
face significant challenges in carving a space of privacy: the street, the
"public space par excellence,"" must also serve as home. These communities
have minimal, if any, facilities and constitute the city's most marginalized
and vulnerable citizens. Yet, in many cases, pavement dwelling
communities are stable, incorporating shops, small industries, and other
commercial enterprises.
Tenants represent the final category of Mumbai's inadequately-housed.
Some of these tenants live within the formal sector, but in housing which is
so rundown and neglected that it amounts to life in slum conditions."
Mumbai's stifling rent control legislation4 1 is one powerful cause of the
35. Patel, supra note 3, at 340.
36. Gandy, supra note 26, at 108.
37. Id.
38. Madhura Swaminathan, Aspects of Urban Poverty in Bombay, 7 ENv'T & URBANIZATION
133, 134 (1995).
39. Id.
40. Anne-Marie Sanvig Knudsen, The Right to the City: Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship
Among Pavement Dwellers in Mumbai, India, 12 (Univ. Coll. London Dev. Planning Unit
Working Paper No. 132, 2007).
41. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 636.
42. Swaminathan, supra note 38, at 136.
43. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 636.
44. Bayat, supra note 1, at 66.
45. Meera Bapat & Indu Agarwal, Our Needs, Our Priorities: Women and Men from the Slums
in Mumbai and Pune Talk about their Needs for Water and Sanitation, 15 ENV'T & URBANIZATION
71 (2003).
46. Sanvig Knudsen, supra note 40, at 13.
47. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 637.
48. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 279-80.
49. See, e.g., The Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2000,
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dilapidation in rental accommodation in the city, as the law hampers the
ability - and the will - of owners to maintain their buildings." Other
tenancies are insecure because of fraud or corruption between the landlord
and landowner," or the involvement of local criminals." In these cases,
although the tenancy appears regular, families may be subject to threats
and extortion in order to retain their homes. Finally, there are high
numbers of individuals and families who rent accommodation in already
informal settlements. These "invisible renters"" are doubly disadvantaged.
Not only are the houses or hutments in which they live subject to
demolition since they fall outside the formal sector, but they are also
generally unable to avail themselves of laws which protect tenants in the
formal sector.'
As this description illustrates, a clear line demarcating slums from
pavement dwellings and chawls or other tenements is difficult to establish:
Appadurai writes that "the insecurely housed poor are everywhere."55 All
informal settlers lack the security, stability and safety that is inherent in the
concept "home" - a fact represented by the scale of evictions taking place
in Mumbai. The India People's Tribunal reported in June 2005 that "more
than 80,000 houses have been demolished by the state government since 8th
December 2004."" While the rate of demolitions and evictions waxes and
wanes with changing government policy,57 large-scale demolitions -
involving thousands of dwellings at a time - are not uncommon."
These various types of informal settlements59 are placed in a position of
contradiction. Their inhabitants are numerically dominant in the city, yet at
the same time inferior. They are un-ignorable but disregarded. Their labor
(incorporating the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947).
50. Gandy, supra note 26, at 118-19.
51. See, e.g., Tenants of Old Buildings Resist Developers, 'Plot' TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 10 2003,
available at http:/ /timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/city/mumbai/Tenants-of-old-
buildings-resist-developers-plot-/articleshow/42904267.cms.
52. Jaideep Gupte, Linking Urban Vulnerability, Infra-power and "Communal" Violence:
Extralegal Security and Policing in South Central Mumbai, Paper presented at the 9th Annual
Global Development Network Conference, Brisbane, Australia 8 Jan. 29-31(2008), available at
http:/ /depot.gdnet.org/gdnshare/pdf2/gdn_1ibrary/annual-conferences/Ninthannualco
nference/Gupte-paper-parallel-session2.3.pdf.
53. Davis, supra note 7, at 42.
54. Id at 42-45.
55. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 637.
56. INDIAN PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BULLDOZING
RIGHTS: A REPORT ON FORCED EVICTIONS AND HOUSING POLICIES FOR THE POOR IN MUMBAi 45
(2005).
57. Gandy, supra note 26, at 125.
58. See, e.g., Kalpana Sharma, Mumbai's Demolition Marathon, THE HINDU, Jan. 22, 2005,
available at http://www.hindu.com/2005/01/22/stories/2005012202221000.htm; P. Sainath,
The Unbearable Lightness of Seeing, THE HINDU, Feb. 5 2005, available at
http://www.hindu.com/2005/02/05/stories/2005020500611000.htm.
59. All these communities constitute irregular, extra-legal, or informal settlements and
this paper shall refer to them as informal settlements, in line with Mumbai NGO practice,
when to do so does not cause confusion as to which type of settlement is under discussion.
However, despite the pejorative connotations of the word "slum" it is at times necessary to
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is essential, yet their presence is marginalized. Nevertheless, the informal
settlers are integral to the functioning of the city, filling the ranks of the
"well-dressed clerks, nurses, postmen, bank tellers and secretaries" that
make up the working classes.' Mumbai's informal settlements do not
constitute backwaters of economic stagnation. For example, the Dharavi
settlement, which is Asia's largest with over one million residents,
generates an estimated E700 million economic output yearly." Pavement
dwellers are also employed in great numbers. Despite the fact that their
wages at times fall well below subsistence levels,62 they are major
contributors to Mumbai's work force.' Moreover, the question of
livelihood cannot be easily separated from that of housing. The home is
often the site of employment and income generation. Moreover there is a
desire to situate the home close to any outside economic opportunities,
whether these are domestic work in the formal sector or office jobs in the
city's core.'
Informal dwellers do not neatly fit into any one demographic. Some
may eke out an existence by begging or through menial, yet long-
established jobs as sweepers or manual scavengers.' However, many can
be considered middle class themselves,' have children enrolled in
secondary and tertiary education,' and are vigorously engaged in activism
and local political action.4
60. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 636. In the words of a prominent housing rights advocate,
"the city of Mumbai can't survive without the slum dwellers. Your drivers of all the cars stay
in slums. Your maidservants that come to your houses stay in slums, many of the police
constables stay in slums, bus drivers stay in slums, a whole range of people - the clerks in the
offices stay in slums. You remove all the slums and your city will come to a halt." Interview
with Housing Rights Advocate, Mumbai (Oct. 17, 2007).
61. See McDougall, supra note 18, at 38.
62. See Swaminathan, supra note 38, at 134. Swaminathan concludes that "the official
poverty lines represent conditions of abject poverty or destitution." Id. at 136.
63. Men work as dock and construction workers, food vendors, and traders, or are self-
employed as tailors or handcart pushers, while women are employed as domestic help by
those living in nearby formal settlements, or take in piece-work during the day. Sundar Burra
& Liz Riley, Electricity to Pavement Dwellers in Mumbai 1 (Society for the Promotion of Area
Resource Centres [SPARC] Working Paper No.97, 1999).
64. See O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 275.
65. Manual scavenging is the practice of cleaning "dry" toilets by hand. It is employment
normally reserved for the most marginalized castes. Sachin Kumar, The Curse of Manual
Scavenging, INDIA TOGETHER, Feb. 26, 2005, available at
http:/ /www.indiatogether.org/2005/feb/dit-scavenger.htm.
66. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 636.
67. During a visit to the Bandra East Slum in 2007, the residents with whom the author
met stressed the importance of formal schooling. One family, whose four children - including
their daughter - had completed secondary school had a son who, his mother told the author
with evident pride, was completing a Bachelor of Commerce, taught and tested in English.
Author Field notes, Oct. 17, 2007 (on file with Author).
68. The engagement of grassroots campaigners in the slums and pavement settlements
has "allowed some of the poorest communities in the city to become visible for the first time,
not just as objects of strategic intervention on behalf of the state but as legitimate social and
political entities in their own right." Gandy, supra note 26, at 119. The activists with whom this
author met while researching in Mumbai lived or had families living in the informal
settlements. At the end of one long day spent meeting women active in community
organizations in the slum area around Bandra East, one activist took the author to the
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Identifying an "average" inhabitant of an informal settlement in
Mumbai is thus virtually impossible. Even when one separates the
informal settlements into types, the communities are too rich in their
infinite variety to fit neatly into the categories desirable for study or
analysis. What is clear, even impressionistically, is that the city of Mumbai
cannot function without its informal sector. The informal sector is itself
more than half the city. But at the same time a full life is not afforded to
these citizens and they are pushed to the margins, both literally and
metaphorically.
Through the political, geographical and social complexity of Mumbai's
informal housing, "the slum" emerges as a legal, territorial and
demographic, rather than merely spatial, construct.' The presence of the
informal settlers, those commonly known as "slum dwellers," must be
understood as a defining social, political, legal, and cultural characteristic
of the city. The complex relationship between the slum dwellers and the
formal city is under constant negotiation in the laws and politics of
Mumbai, and plays out between the citizens, and between citizens and the
state. The struggle is strongly informed by the important tradition of
housing rights protection in the city, examined in the next section.
III. THE GROWTH OF THE HOUSING RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN MUMBAI
Having set out the physical and social realities of life in Mumbai, thus
providing the context in which legal struggles over and around the right
must be seen, this section briefly discusses the growth of the distinctive
housing rights movement in the city.
India has a long history of internally-born activism and social
movements.70 An independent and activist judiciary applies and interprets
a constitution which plays a significant role in the structure and
development of the Indian state. 72 The Constitution includes both a bill of
judicially enforceable rights' and social and economic guarantees in the
form of "Directive Principles of State Policy" (DPSP).'
A western style rights consciousness permeated the Indian struggle for
settlement at Bandra Terminus. There, off a small alley and up a ladder-like stair case, the
activist proudly showed off her Aunt's spotless house, where her young cousin served a tin
plate of rice and curry and demonstrated how to work her ipod nano, as the sun slanted
warmly through the window. Author Field notes, Oct. 17, 2007 (on file with Author).
69. Rao, supra note 18, at 229.
70. See generally Sandip Hazareesingh, The Quest for Urban Citizenship: Civic Rights, Public
Opinion, and Colonial Resistance in Early Twentieth-Century Bombay, 34 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 797
(2000).
71. See G.B. Reddy, Supreme Court and Judicial Activism: An Overview of its Impact on
Constitutionalism, 3 Sup. CT. J. 19, 19 (2001).
72. Granville Austin, A Historian's Reflections on the Indian Constitution, in HUMAN RIGHI-s,
JusTICE & CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT, xxii, xxii (C. R. Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds.,
2007).
73. INDIA CONST. arts. 12-35.
74. INDIA CONST. arts. 36-51.
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independence from British rule,5 and the western tradition's most
influential and powerful declarations of rights and liberties are reflected in
the constitutional text2 ' However, despite this deep influence, the role of
the Indian state in the protection of the peoples' fundamental rights is
different from the role a western liberal state would be assumed to take.
Indeed, as Singh argues, the Constitutional structure requires that:
Whether the individual asks for his rights or not, the state must
secure them to him. The state must know that the people have
rights irrespective of their demand for them and that not only has
it to honour them by non-interference but has also to secure them
to each and every person by positive action."
As such, the Constitution envisions an interventionist role for the state
in the realm of human rights protection in India.
In Mumbai, activism around decent and adequate housing as an
entitlement can be found as early as the first decades of the twentieth
century, by which point, as Hazareesingh notes, "Bombay had emerged as
the centrepoint of public pressure ... on the issue of rights."' Struggles for
housing as a right were linked, even during colonial times, with the issues
of livelihood, working conditions, civic participation, and rights to
citizenship itself."'
Mumbai's urban population is highly formally educated, but is also
schooled in the brutal process of eviction and relocation. The convergence
of these "educations" would seem the perfect breeding ground for a
culture of rights, rights consciousness, or rights awareness. As de Feyter
states: "[t]he communities which go through a human rights crisis build up
knowledge - a usage of human rights linked to concrete living
conditions."' Indeed, in Mumbai human rights campaigns and struggles
have become common, and many of these struggles revolve around issues
of housing.
In the 1980s, following the government's attempt to evict many
thousands of pavement dwellers living along the verges of Mumbai's
highways,"' a wave of protest grew and NGOs and grassroots
organizations campaigned for a constitutional amendment to enshrine a
75. Mahendra P. Singh, Constitutionalization and Realization of Human Rights in India, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE & CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 26, 29-30 (C. R. Kumar & K.
Chockalingam eds., 2007); Leela Simon & Chiranjivi J. Nirmal, Fundamental Rights: The
Constitutional Context of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA: HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 40, 40-42 (Chiranjivi J. Nirmal ed., 2000).
76. Simon & Nirmal, supra note 75, at 44.
77. Singh, supra note 75, at 40.
78. Hazareesingh, supra note 70, at 812.
79. Id. at 804.
80. Koen de Feyter, Localising Human Rights, in ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 76 (W. Benedek et al. eds., 2007).
81. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 183-84.
2010) 145
11
Hohmann: Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Human Rights in Mumbai: The Struggle for the Right to Housing
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
fundamental right to housing." These campaigns saw the role of the state
as crucial in the provision of the right to housing." While the attempt to
amend the constitution failed," the impact of the campaign was significant:
"the housing issue became part of the national public and political
discourse."" Meanwhile, in large part through petitions brought by
individuals and organizations involved in these street level protests,
another rights-based approach to housing was emerging in the Indian
Supreme Court jurisprudence on Article 21 - the right to life.
The picture that emerges from this description of the housing situation
in Mumbai is one in which the right to housing and the political
mobilization around it play a significant role. Mumbai's long history of
housing rights activism is linked to issues of citizenship and social change,
political struggle and the forces of urbanization and modernization. The
role of law in these struggles is complex, and it is this aspect of Mumbai's
housing rights situation which this article now addresses.
IV. JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO HOUSING: THE JURISPRUDENCE
This Part provides a concrete example of the legal response to the
political and social housing rights movement in India, describing and
analyzing the housing rights jurisprudence crafted by the Supreme Court
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It sets out the leading cases on
the right to housing, detailing the reasoning of the Court and scrutinizing
the philosophical and social vision of Indian society revealed in the case
law. It thus provides a picture of the right to housing in Indian
constitutional law.
The Indian judiciary is the guardian of Constitutional rights.8 It has
played an activist role in interpreting the fundamental rights and
freedoms," extending their content to include the socio-economic goals
underlying the directive principles of state policy.' In addition, the
Supreme Court has "pioneered" novel forms of litigation to achieve this
integration of socio-economic goals through fundamental rights."
Although in the early years of Independence the Court employed a
"literal" interpretation of the Constitution," by the end of the 1970s it
82. joY DESHMUKH-RANADIVE, HOUSING THE POOR: How RELEVANT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?




86. INDIA CONST. art. 32.
87. Id. arts. 12-35.
88. Reddy, supra note 71, at 22.
89. Jayna Kothari, Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade, in
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (D. Barak-Erez & A. Gross
eds., 2007).
90. Arun Thiruvengadam, The Global Dialogue Among Courts: Social Rights Jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court of India from a Comparative Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND
CONsTiTUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 277 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007).
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began to develop procedural and substantive techniques to ensure
fulfillment of these social justice policies.1 The housing rights
jurisprudence is a prominent example of this judicial activism.
Although the Indian Supreme Court has widely employed
international norms to inform its understanding of the Indian human rights
system,2 the Indian Jurisprudence on the right to housing is analytically
separate from the right to housing as codified and interpreted in the
international human rights covenants. Rather, the Indian judiciary has
created a distinct jurisprudence on the right to housing under the right to
life in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.'
This approach can be read as a judicial refusal to see the Indian
Constitution as lacking in or inferior to any international norm of human
rights protection: Mani notes that it appears that the judiciary interprets
Article 21 as "adequately all-pervasive of all human rights, both present
and evolving."5 Nevertheless, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
rights now encompassed by Article 21 remain a radical expansion of the
right to life. India's Supreme Court has been characterized as fearlessly
activist,9 6 and it has been argued that the "contribution of the Supreme
Court in respect of widening the scope of the right to life and personal
liberty under Article 21, is the most valuable contribution, the judicial
activism has made, in any part of the world."9 7
This expansion of the right to life and personal liberty did not first arise
in socio-economic rights cases, but out of the jurisprudence on the rights of
detainees: in the breakthrough case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,98 the
Court took control of Article 21 and began its rapid extension beyond the
91. Id. at 279.
92. K.G. Balakrishnan, Good Governance in International Law: An Indian Perspective, 32
SOUTH AFR.Y.B. INT'L L. 25, 37 (2007).
93. Specifically, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 11(1)
states as follows: "The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States
Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right ... " G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added). See also International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families G.A.
Res. 45/158 (1990) art 43(1)(d); Convention on the Rights of the Child G.A. Res 44/25 (1989)
art 27(3); Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women G.A.
Res. 34/180 (1979) art 14(2)(h); International Covenant on the Elimination of All forms of
Racial Discrimination G.A. Res. 2106A (XX) UN DOC (1965) art. 5(e)(iii); Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees G.A. Res. 529V (1951) art. 21; Universal Declaration of Human Rights
G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc/ A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); European Social Charter (Revised)
CETS No.: 163 (1999). The leading interpretation of the right to housing in international law
can be found in Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to
Adequate Housing, U.N. Doc E/1992/23, annex 111 (1991).
94. "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law." INDIA CONST. art. 21.
95. V. S. MANI, Human Rights in India: A Survey, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS OF INDIA's
INDEPENDENCE 173 (K.P. Sakensa ed., 1999).
96. Shehnaz Meer, Litigating Fundamental Rights: Rights Litigation and Social Action
Litigation in India: A Lesson for South Africa, 9 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 358, 372 (1993).
97. Reddy, supra note 71, at 20.
98. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
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procedural guarantee suggested by the text." It was at this point that, as
Ramanathan writes, the Court began to make the Constitution relevant to
the "marginalized masses,"a fleshing out concepts of the right to life with
human dignity, which underpin the developments of law in this area.
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,"o'
which was handed down in 1981, did not, on its face, involve housing or
shelter. The plaintiff was concerned with challenging the legality of her
detention. However, the case provided an opportunity for the Court to
develop the meaning of Article 21; as such, it represents the well-spring of
a line of reasoning from which the housing rights cases flow. Justice
Bhagwati, writing for the Court, noted that the right to life "is the most
precious human right" which "forms the arc of all other rights."'o 2 For that
reason, the right to life must "be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit
so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years
to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the
human person." 3 The Court hereby signaled the philosophical basis upon
which to found its expansion of the right. Accordingly, Justice Bhagwati
continued:
We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human
dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries
of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the
head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in
diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling
with fellow human beings.
Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this
right would depend upon the extent of the economic development
of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the
right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on
such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum
expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or
impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of
this right to live . ...
The Court thus invested the right to life with the basic material goods
necessary for human dignity.
99. See Kothari, supra note 89, at 175.
100. Usha Ramanathan, Of Judicial Power, FRONTLINE MAG., Mar. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f1l906/19060300.htm.
101. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746.
102. Id. at 752.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 753.
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Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation" brought the question of
housing and shelter squarely before the court in a petition on behalf of
Mumbai's slum and pavement dwellers.?' The Municipal Corporation had
sought to evict a large community of informal dwellers without notice or
compensation, forcibly relocating them to the fringes of the city by bus.'
The petitioners argued that eviction from their homes would deprive them
of their livelihoods, and hence, their right to life under Article 21. They
alleged that the government should provide alternative accommodation to
them to guarantee their rights to life. 8
The Court followed Justice Bhagwati's line of reasoning in Mullin.
Recalling the Directive Principles of State Policy,"O Chief Justice
Chandrachud wrote for the Court that given the Indian state's obligation
"to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to
work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from
the content of the right to life."" While he noted that the state could not be
compelled to provide work to the citizen through affirmative action,' he
nevertheless maintained that "any person, who is deprived of his right to
livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law,
can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by
Article 21.""2
Having determined that the right to life includes the right to
livelihood, the Court stated that it would "assume the factual correctness of
the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they
will be deprived of their livelihoods.""' In coming to this conclusion, the
Court exhibited a keen awareness of the structural causes of rural poverty
and the link with urban informality. Justice Chandrachud stated that:
One of the major causes of the persistent rural poverty ... is the
extremely narrow base of production available to the majority of
the rural population. The average agricultural holding of a farmer
is 0. 4 [sic] hectares, which is hardly adequate to enable him to
make both ends meet. Landless labourers have no resource base at
all and they constitute the hard core of poverty. Due to economic
pressures and lack of employment opportunities, the rural
population is forced to migrate to urban areas in search of
employment."'
As a result of the close connection between life and livelihood, the
105. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
106. Id. at 183.
107. Ramanthan, supra note 19, at 2909.
108. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 183-84.




113. Id. at 193.
114. Id. at 190.
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Court held that evictions could only take place "according to procedure
established by law," as mandated by Article 21."5 The case thus provided
an important procedural guarantee that evictions, at least in circumstances
in which the inhabitants would be deprived of their livelihoods, must take
place in accordance with lawful process or stand in violation of the
constitutional right to life.
However, the Court denied the petitioners' substantive claim that they
have a right to the pavement itself. Thus:
There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the
petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up
constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make
use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing
claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter ....
[Ilt is erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have the
right to encroach upon pavement by constructing dwellings
thereon."'
In consequence, even while the Court recognized that the
encroachments made by the petitioners were "involuntary acts in the sense
that those acts are compelled by inevitable circumstances and . . . not
guided by choice,""'7 it held that the municipality had been justified in
ordering the removal of the petitioners' homes."' The petitioners did not
have a right to make their homes on the pavements, as "[no one has the
right to make use of public property for private purpose without the
requisite authorization."" 9
The Court took the initiative in setting out what would constitute fair
procedure in this case. It ordered the authorities to delay any evictions
until the end of the monsoon season and further, required the Municipal
Corporation to provide alternative accommodation for those pavement
dwellers whose hutments had been recorded by census or through the
grant of identity cards, which proved the individuals' longstanding
settlement in the area.'2
Olga Tellis was followed by subsequent cases implying a right to
housing and shelter into the right to life. In Shantistar Builders v. Narayan
Khimalal Totame,12' handed down in 1990, another group of pavement
dwellers approached the Court seeking enforcement of legislation that
sought to prevent land accumulation by powerful interests, and at the
same time provide flats to house the economically "weaker sections of
115. Id. at 196.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Id. at 201.
118. Id. at 197.
119. Id. at 198.
120. Id. at 202. The order in Olga Tellis has had far-reaching impacts on the rights and
entitlements of Mumbai's informal settlers. See the discussion in Part V.
121. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 S.C.C. 520.
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society."'" Here, in the process of revising and expanding the guidelines
for the construction and provision of the subsidized flats, the Court
reaffirmed that "[tihe right to life is guaranteed in any civilized society.
That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the
right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in."'
Moreover, the Court noted that a human being requires not only "the bare
protection of the body [but] suitable accommodation which would allow
him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual."'2 4 The
reasoning thus encompasses not only a right to life with dignity, but
appears to accept a constitutional right to a life of intellectual and material
flourishing.
The Court's concern to protect the "weaker sections" of society is an
important theme expressed in the judicial reasoning on the right to
housing. Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, handed down in 1996, is
particularly notable in this respect.'" The case was brought by landowners
whose properties were subject to compulsory acquisition by the state
government. The government desired to acquire the lands to provide
housing for "Scheduled Castes,"1 26 for whom the Constitution mandates
governmental affirmative action.'2 7 The owners argued that the acquisition
of their lands would violate their right to life under Article 21, because the
lands were their source of livelihood. 2 8
The Court was not convinced by the landowners' case. In fact, the
judgment does not even address the arguments raised by the landowners
on the link between their property and livelihood, appearing to reject it out
of hand.'" Instead, Justice Ramaswamy (writing for the Court) invokes the
Preamble's principles of economic justice and material distribution for the
benefit of the marginalized.'" The Court's reasoning is built around the
judicial assumption that laws created to benefit the worst off cannot be
invoked by the powerful, and is clearly animated by the concept of equality
and economic and social justice revealed in the judgment.3 1
The judgment thus represents a remarkable willingness to uphold the
government's public policy legislation, despite the impact on individual
property rights.132 Taking judicial notice of the "appalling housing
122. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, No. 33 of 1976; India Code (1976), 20(2)(1).
123. Shantistar, (1990) 1 S.C.C. at 527.
124. Id.
125. Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Predesh (1996) 2 S.C.C. 549,553.
126. Id. at 552.
127. Schedules to the Indian Constitution set out various historically marginalized castes
and tribes for affirmative action measures. See INDIA CONST. scheds 5-6.
128. Chameli Singh, (1996) 2 S.C.C. at 552.
129. Id. at 552-53. The Court deals with the entire argument of the petitioners in a few
short paragraphs.
130. Id. at 553.
131. Id. at 553-57. See, for example, the discussion of India's international human rights
obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 25(1) and International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 11(1) at 553 and the discussion of
balancing competing aims for social justice under the Constitution, id. at 556.
132. This can be contrasted with the court's earlier "pre-activist" period. Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, Judicial Governance and the Ideology of Human Rights: Reflections from a Social
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condition" of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes,'33 the Court then argued
that it was clear that the state had undertaken the provision of housing to
Dalits and Tribes as an economic policy "on a war footing,"" in order to
comply with its constitutional and international obligations.3 Thus, it
concluded, the individual right of the owners must "yield to the larger
public purpose.""'
The Court's characterization of housing and shelter is a second
compelling strand in the reasoning. On this point, the Court stressed the
fundamental importance of housing and shelter to a full human life, noting
that "[wlant of decent residence... frustrates the very object of the
constitutional animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental
right to residence, dignity of person and right to live itself."'31 It continued,
describing the state's duty to provide opportunities and facilities to the
oppressed sections of Indian society as "fundamental.""
Chameli Singh presents housing as having a public purpose with an
impact on community and social inclusion. As the Court stated:
In a democratic society ... one should have permanent shelter so
as to physically, mentally and intellectually equip oneself to
improve his excellence as a useful citizen as enjoined in the
Fundamental Duties and to be a useful citizen and equal
participant in democracy. The ultimate object of making a man
equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of status is
to enable him to develop himself into a cultured being.
In other words, the animation behind the Indian Constitution's right to
housing and shelter is one that recognizes both the importance of the
private right to housing, and the public need for the conditions of life that
enable individuals to contribute and flourish as citizens.
In 1997, the Court handed down its third major housing rights case,
Ahmedabad Municipal Corp. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan,' again addressing
the rights of the State of Maharashtra's pavement dwellers. In this case, the
Movement Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 206
(C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007). The Court's struggle to control the right to
property is a striking example of this pre-activist phase. As originally drafted, the
Fundamental Rights included a right to private property. The judiciary upheld this right in
the face of State attempts at land nationalization for the fulfillment of the Constitution's
Directive Principles of economic and social equality. The state responded by repealing
property as a fundamental right, replacing it in a part of the Constitution (Art. 300A) where it
cannot be enforced by the courts. CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVIsTS
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 84 (1998).
133. Chameli Singh, (1996) 2 S.C.C. at 559.
134. Id. at 560.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 562.
137. Id. at 556.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Ahmedabad Mun. Corp. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 152.
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Court invoked precedent from Olga Tellis and Chameli Singh, to state that
the right to life clearly included a right to life with dignitym' and to lay out
the constitutional obligations of the state in securing this dignified life.'4 2
The Nawab Khan Gulab Khan judgment is an attempt to apply the
guidelines for the eviction of pavement dwellers that were developed in
Olga Tellis. In its effort to standardize the Olga Tellis requirements for
evictions within the limits of the Constitution, the case is the first
illustration of the competing interests and principles at play in the
determination of housing rights, which the Court struggles to balance in
the judgment.
Justice Ramaswamy, again writing for the Court, invoked the relevance
of Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, and Article
11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights to the question before the Court."' He made reference to the duty of
the state to "provide" a right to shelter for the poor and indigent.'"
Moreover, he took note of the fact that one did not need to look far to find
the reasons why municipalities allow pavement dwellings to be built,45
thus illustrating a sympathy with the plight of those who dwell on the
roadsides but also with those who seek to control such unauthorized
homes. He argued that it would be unconstitutional to attempt to prevent
Indians from migrating and settling in areas where greater livelihood and
life chances are available.'4 1 Justice Ramaswamy noted that the poor
agricultural laborers, middle, and upper classes, flock to the cities where
there are greater opportunities.1 4 7 He found it "unfortunate" that half a
century after India's independence, little infrastructure exists in rural India
and little comprehensive planning has been undertaken to remedy the
deficiency."
A considerable part of the judgment is devoted to outlining and
assessing the adequacy of the government's scheme to re-house these and
other pavement dwellers.149 The scheme echoes back to the order in Olga
Tellis in that it requires notice, and, in some instances, the provision of
alternate dwellings to those affected by the eviction. However, in Nawab
Khan Gulab Khan the Court is concerned with elucidating how the
protections offered to informal dwellers in Olga Tellis can be narrowed.
For example, Justice Ramaswamy stressed that the sooner the
"encroachments" of the pavement dwellers' houses were removed the
better. He noted that quick action on the part of the government prevents
the dwellers from claiming the "semblance of right to obstruct removal of
141. Id. at 163.
142. Id. at 158.
143. Id. at 157-58.
144. Id. at 159.
145. Id. at 157.
146. Id. at 163.
147. Id at 162-63.
148. Id. at 162.
149. Id. at 159-64.
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the encroachment."" The judgment recommends that the authorities
"ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places."m1 It further
suggests that, if encroachments can be dealt with as soon as they arise, "the
need to follow the procedure of principle of natural justice could be
obviated.""' In this case, Justice Ramaswamy proposes only a short notice
period of "say two weeks or 10 days,"53 and, given the implementation of
such a fair notice period, "the right to hearing before taking action for
ejectment is not necessary in the fact-situation.""' The judicial statement
that a hearing may not be necessary before eviction is a reduction in the
legal protections available to informal dwellers subject to eviction.
Justice Ramaswamy also determined that pavement dwellers do not
have transferrable property rights in their dwellings. As such, any
transfer by rent or sale of the hutment was void ab initio," and any
pavement dweller who had acquired his hut from another informal
pavement dweller was ineligible for re-housing.' Moreover, the Court
stressed the state's duty to remove the pavement dwellers so as to make
the pavements accessible for pedestrians.' Justice Ramaswamy thus
recalled Olga Tellis as authority for the proposition that pavement dwellers
have no right to make private use of public space.' He also reinforced the
principle that pedestrians have a right to the pavement in order that they
"are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety
and security"" while pavement dwellers do not.' This illustrates that, as
Ramanathan points out with respect to the housing rights jurisprudence,
on the issue of the contest between pedestrians and pavement dwellers,
"the latter definitively lost." 62 The competing interests evident in the
Nawab Khan case prefigure more recent cases discussed in Parts VI.A, VI.B,
and VI.C, in which informal dwellers have been characterized in radically
different - and less sympathetic ways. Nevertheless, the Olga Tellis line of
cases remains good law, and has had a significant impact on human rights
theory, practice, and activism.
On the whole, Indian Supreme Court cases on the right to housing and
shelter" have been welcomed across the world as revealing a perceptive,
profound and contextualized view of human life and the interconnected




154. Id. at 162.
155. Id. at 164-65.
156. Id. at 165.
157. Id. at 166.




162. Ramanathan, supra note 19, at 2910.
163. It should be pointed out that the Indian cases do not reveal a meaningful distinction
between housing and shelter, perhaps given the Court's rich conception of shelter and
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nature of all human rights - from equality to livelihood, from social
inclusion to education.'" However, as Kothari argues, the cases are
relatively few in number, the order granted in each is situation specific,
and the remedies are ad hoc.'5 She notes that "in none of the major
judgments on housing rights has the Supreme Court given concrete
positive orders for the enforcement of this right."'" Yet, in many ways, the
judgments reveal a coherent interpretation of the right to life and its
relationship with adequate housing and shelter. The cases spell out a
multifaceted interpretation of the right to life that includes attention to
issues of material needs, structural equality, dignity, opportunity, and even
intellectual flourishing. And they have provided a discourse through
which to understand the interconnections among the various facets of a
decent human life.
The existence of such powerful discourses can provide an important
space in which to negotiate with the state regarding its human rights
obligations to citizens.1 7 Moreover, it is significant that this conceptual
space exists within the law, rather than as a moral, religious, or political
argument about need," as law grounds a powerful claim to inclusion and
visibility." The discourse challenges the perception that the codification of
human rights in legal texts freezes the content of the rights and prevents
the redress of emerging harms and changing recognitions of human
injustice, a concern that has plagued some written constitutions7o and an
argument that has been used against the introduction of bills of rights in
some states.1 71 It also profoundly undermines the argument that economic,
social and cultural rights such as the right to housing are somehow
philosophically or qualitatively separate from civil and political rights such
as the right to life, given the holistic and indivisible view of all human
rights reflected in the Indian Supreme Court's approach.
The impact of this discourse extends beyond the borders of the state.
As Ghai argues, the Indian Supreme Court has "opened a public, and
worldwide, dialogue on rights that would scarcely have been possible
without its own discourse on rights and the social and economic condition
164. See, e.g., Meer, supra note 96, at 359; Special Rapporteur on the right to food, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD, JEAN ZEIGLER, MISSION TO INDIA 24 U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.2 (Mar. 20, 2006); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Human Rights: A
Worldwide Dialogue, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA 214 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
165. Kothari, supra note 89, at 183.
166. Id.
167. For example, in the context of the right to housing of indigenous peoples in Canada,
see Jessie Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18
TRANSNAT'L LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 295, 308-09 (2009).
168. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 412-13 (1987).
169. See infra Part VI.A.
170. In the United States, for example, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1093 (1989).
171. See GEORGE WILLIAMS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA 36 (2001) (cataloguing the
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of India."" For example, the South African Constitutional Court, which is
constitutionally mandated to consider violations of the right to housing,'
uses concepts of dignity in considering what constitutes a reasonable
legislative response to situations of profoundly inadequate housing, 4 and
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has developed a body of
jurisprudence on the right to a dignified life.'" Academics beyond India
have also taken hold of the concept of the right to life with dignity, and the
necessary recognition of socio-economic elements within this right. For
example, Gearty and Griffin have both made the idea of dignity a central
plank in their recent theoretical contributions to human rights."' Finally,
international NGOs have also embraced the concept of the right to life with
human dignity, and its vital connection to economic and social goods. For
example, Amnesty International - which until recently maintained a
steadfast focus on civil and political rights'" - has launched its "Global
Campaign for Human Dignity," in which the organization recognizes that:
Poverty is not just a lack of income; it is the denial of access to the
resources, capability, security and power that people need in order
to realize their human right to live with dignity. Universal human
dignity can only become a reality through respect for the full range
of human rights-from adequate housing and physical integrity to
access to information.
These examples illustrate that although the Indian jurisprudence on the
right to life represents a unique judicial response to the deprivation of
adequate housing, the reasoning of the Court has contributed to the
international development of human rights, both theoretically and
practically.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE: LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The conceptual impact of the jurisprudence on the right to life with
172. See Gash Yhai, Foreword, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
EMPOWERMENT x, xi (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007).
173. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. § 26 (right to housing), § 38 (enforcement of rights).
174. See DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF Socio-ECONOMIc RIGHTS 137-38 (2007).
175. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. & Paraguay Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 125 Uune 17, 2005); Jo Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The
Integration of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1 (2008).
176. CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? (2006); JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (2008).
177. The mandate was expanded in 2001. The History of Amnesty International,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history (last visited Dec. 8, 2009).
178. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY, ACT 35/0032007
(2007), available at http://asiapacificamnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT350032007?
open&of=ENG-200.
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dignity and its encompassing of the right to housing or shelter are
important. However, it is the effect on the individual slum or pavement
dwellers and other marginalized or homeless individuals in Mumbai
which is more direct and pressing. How, then, has this jurisprudence
transformed their lives? What improvements has it rendered in their daily
existence? And what are the implications of these results for the judicial
protection of the right to housing in Mumbai? In this Part, the article will
examine two examples of concrete, practical effects of the judgments. The
first is the requirement for rehabilitation and compensation in the case of
slum and pavement demolition or eviction. The second concerns the
protections provided through the concept of the "cut-off date."
Not all the effects and implications arising from these policies have
been positive. However, the results must not only be considered in contrast
to the ideal housing rights situation in Mumbai, but also to the situation
that would likely prevail absent the judgments. Thus, the picture revealed
is complex, and provides no easy conclusions on the role of the right to
housing in the transformation of the social environment of Mumbai.
The order granted by the Court in Olga Tellis is far-reaching, with
implications beyond the specific petitioners that address the condition of
informal dwellers everywhere in the city. The Court required, in part, that:
[P]avement dwellers who were censused or who happened to be
censused in 1976 should be given, though not as a condition
precedent to their removal, alternate pitches at Malavani or, at
such other convenient place as the Government considers
reasonable but not farther away in terms of distance; slum dwellers
who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were
numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their
resettlement; slums which have been in existence for a long time,
say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved and
developed will not be removed unless the land on which they
stand or the appurtenant land, is required for a public purpose, in
which case, alternate sites of accommodation will be provided to
them....in
The order is an example of the judiciary's development of innovative
remedies in fundamental rights cases. The remedies, which are
"unorthodox and unconventional," are "intended to initiate positive action
on the part of the state and its authorities."" Despite some controversy and
doubt as to the efficacy and appropriateness of such remedies," they have
been largely accepted as legitimate. Indeed, the legislature and executive at
state, national, and local levels do engage with the judicial orders, which
179. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 204.
180. Kothari, supra note 89, at 175.
181. See, e.g., Reddy, supra note 71, 24-27; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial
Sovereignty, in THE STATE OF INDIA'S DEMOCRACY (Sumit Ganguly et al. eds., 2007).
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often require the government to put new policies in place, take active steps
to create certain social conditions, and take on many other judicially
mandated tasks.8 2
This has been the case with the order arising from the Olga Tellis
litigation. In the wake of the judgment, several judicial conditions
stipulated in the case were picked up by the government and turned into
broader legislation. These conditions included the concept of a "cut-off
date" for protection of informal settlements and the concept of
rehabilitation and compensation in the case of eviction. Accordingly, a
legislative framework based around the key requirements of the Olga Tellis
judgment has emerged.
This scheme is now largely contained in the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act."' The Act is based
around two main principles. The first is that certain informal settlements
become subject to a modicum of legal protection under the Act: those
dwelling in these structures are entitled to "rehabilitation and
compensation" in the case of eviction. The second, related, protection is the
concept of the "cut-off date." Informal dwellings built before the cut-off
date are "protected structures" under the Act, and their residents are thus
entitled to rehabilitation and compensation.
A. Rehabilitation and Compensation
The Slum Areas Act contains the legislative scheme covering
protection, improvement, clearance, and redevelopment of informal
settlements in Mumbai. It provides a large measure of protection for
informal dwellers. Importantly, as an instrument for advocacy, it can be
relied upon as a codification of principles which activists and residents can
point to when the government deviates from them. It also provides a point
of political negotiation, most importantly at election timeJ4 However, the
scheme is controversial. Significant problems, addressed below, range from
issues of practical implementation and political will, to dissatisfaction with
the principles informing the legislation itself.
The Act refers to informal settlements as slums throughout, although
communities of pavement dwellers could also fall within its protections if
182. The Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan case on workplace sexual harassment is a striking
example where the Court order included a set of mandatory guidelines for employers. The
Court included in its guidelines preventative steps, compliance mechanisms, and disciplinary
action. Drawing heavily on The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW). Moreover, it declared the judicial guidelines as having the force of
law. These guidelines have formed the basis of a slate of binding requirements on employers,
both in the public and private sectors, with Parliament only now beginning to consider a
legislative scheme. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 1997 A.I.R. S.C. 3011 as explained by ICHRL
Women's Rights Activist, Author Field notes (on file with Author).
183. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20.
184. Gandy, supra note 26, at 123 (explaining the importance of electoral promises to
provide free housing to the political success of the Shiv Sena Party in Maharashtra).
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notified under Chapter II." The Act divides informal dwellers into two
distinct categories. The first are "protected occupiers."'" Protected
occupiers are those in possession of a "photo-pass: a government-issued
document that acts as proof of residence in the settlement over a certain
number of years.'" Those dwellers classed as protected occupiers benefit
from legislative safeguards and in the case of eviction or demolition are
covered by various provisions of the Act.'" Those who fall outside the
definition of protected occupier are not able to access these legislative
protections, and thus their dwellings remain outside the law.
The safeguards afforded to protected occupiers by the Slum Areas Act
are not equal to ownership of the land or the house constructed on it;
rather, they are substantive and procedural safeguards to be fulfilled by the
government during slum clearance.'" They do not equal full security of
tenure."' However, under the Act the government can only demolish a
slum or pavement dwelling of a protected occupier "in the larger public
interest."l 92 Moreover, the potential evictee must be offered relocation and
rehabilitation.1 93 Rehabilitation, in which each family is to be given a
replacement apartment to compensate for the loss of its original dwelling,
takes the form of re-housing, most often in a purpose-built, multistory
building.' While the legislation suggests that the replacement dwelling
should be offered "free of cost,"" in reality informal dwellers are often
subjected to significant charges for their new flats." If the family has been
running a commercial enterprise from their dwelling, it may be entitled to
an alternative shop space.9 The Slum Areas Act thus recognizes that slum
and pavement dwellings represent more than shelter, as they are also the
base for economic activity and community.
In some cases, if the dweller declines such rehabilitation or an alternate
site is unavailable, he or she is entitled to compensation in the form of a
monetary payment, designed to enable the purchase of other
185. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, at § 4.
186. Id. § 3Z-1.
187. Id. § 3Y-1.
188. Kalpana Sharma, Mumbai, Monsoon and the Many Makeovers, THE HINDU, June 4, 2005,
available at http:/ /www.thehindu.com/2005/06/04/stories/2005060402151000.htm.
189. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20 Chapter I-8 §§ 3X-3Z-2.
190. Id. § 3B-4 (a)-(g).
191. Pimple & John, supra note 23, at 75-83.
192. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, § 3Z-2.
193. Id.
194. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 280.
195. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, § 3B-4(d).
196. See Bombay Envtl. Action Group & Another v. A.R. Bharati, Deputy Conservator of
Forest, Sanjay Gandhi Nat'l Park, Borivili & Others (2004) (5) LJSOFT 951 26 Bombay H. C. of
Judicature (Writ Petition No. 305 of 1995) (ordering that those slum dwellers eligible for
rehabilitation pay Rs7000 per family to take up their new homes).
197. This will depend on the specifics of the rehabilitation scheme set up under Chapter
1A of the Act. See, for example, the rehabilitation provisions under the Dharavi
Redevelopment Project. Maharashtra Slum Rehabilitation Authority, Dharavi Redevelopment
Project FAQs, http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/faqs.htm, (last visited Dec. 8, 2009).
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accommodation." However, the price of land in Mumbai is exorbitant.'" In
the current market, it is impossible for any but the rich to buy an alternate
dwelling within the city itself: even a small, tent-sized, plot of land in an
established slum area costs twice Mumbai's average annual household
income83 Vacant land appears non-existent,2' and defunct mill lands and
industrial sites are being transformed, into commercial complexes such as
air-conditioned shopping malls or financial services and technology
industry enclaves.' Thus, even when compensation is paid, a family often
ends up pushed into a poorer quality, less stable, and more remotely
located home.2 03
Rehabilitation means re-housing a slum or pavement dweller family
within the formal housing sector. Normally, it involves relocation to a
"transit camp"' - a one room temporary accommodation where the
inhabitants are housed while a more permanent dwelling is built.2" The
problems documented with respect to relocation in Mumbai are legion
(although for some informal settlements the process has proved to be a
positive one.)206 First, while transit camps are designed to house people
only temporarily,207 they often remain inhabited for years due to delays in
readying the permanent accommodation. 208 Transit camps are made
necessary by the fact that informal settlements are razed long before
alternative permanent housing is made available.2 0 Moreover, a transit
camp itself does not constitute adequate housing.210
Second, even the permanent rehabilitation buildings are often poorly
constructed (with violation of building codes and standards being
198. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20 § 16.
199. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 638 (explaining that in the late 1990s, despite a "dramatic"
drop in real estate prices, the cost of a flat in a desirable area of Mumbai would be $300,000-
$350,000 USD). Likewise, Suketu Metha writes that "Coming from New York, I am a pauper
in Bombay" where a south Bombay apartment will cost "$3000 a month, plus $200,000 for a
deposit." SUKETU METHA, MAXIMUM CITY: BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND 19(2007).
200. Nijman, supra note 15, at 76.
201. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 276.
202. Marie-Hlane Z6rah, Conflict between Green Space Preservation and Housing Needs: The
Case of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park in Mumbai, 24 CITIES 122, 130 (2007).
203. Id. at 130-131; Nijman, supra note 15, at 78.
204. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, § 3A-4(d), 11(1).
205. Swaminathan, supra note 38, at 142 n.52.
206. See, e.g., Nijman, supra note 15, at 78 (documenting one such positive relocation
experience for the inhabitants of Ganesh Nagar D).
207. Mandakini Gahlot, Mumbai Plays Role Model for Delhi Slum Rehabilitation Scheme,
EXPRESS INDIA, Oct. 20 2009, available at http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/mumbai-
plays-role-model-for-delhi-slum-rehabilitation-scheme/530773/.
208. See, e.g., Slum Dwellers Happy to Stay, THE STANDARD, Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news detail.asp?we cat=9&artid=1077&sid=4494089&co
n-type=3&dstr=20050912; Interview with Anonymous, COHRE Women's Housing Rights
Officer, in Mumbai (Oct. 18, 2007).
209. Praveen Swami, Pie in the Sky, FRONTLINE MAG., Sept. 29, 2001, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll820/18200500.htm.
210. Swaminathan, supra note 38, at 142 n.52. One activist describes these houses as "built
in a jiffy." Id. The quality of construction is substandard and they are un-insulated, so "boiling
in the summer and freezing in the winter." Interview with COHRE Officer, supra note 208.
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"routine"2 1 1 ) and inappropriate to the economic needs of the inhabitants, as
many informal dwellers make their livings from their homes, whether
through small business or industry.'12 The unsuitability of the rehabilitation
buildings as sites of employment is compounded by their cramped and
inorganic nature. The space allotted per family is small: in most of the
rehabilitation schemes created under the Slum Areas Act, it is set at 225
square feet (21 square meters).2 13 While informal dwellings often begin as
one room, their construction is an organic process able to accommodate a
growing family and even a shop-front or business.21 4 Rehabilitation
buildings do not have this flexibility,215 and given the often large sizes of
extended families living together in one dwelling, the rehabilitation
buildings do little to ease the chronic overcrowding of the city's
dwellings.2 1 6
The negative effect on livelihood is compounded by the fact that the
rehabilitation sites are often situated significant distances from the
previous dwellings.2 17 The problems of moving communities from their
traditional location have been widely studied in many cultural contexts,
and a wealth of literature has been produced highlighting the human
rights violations which often result from even the most well-intentioned or
carefully planned relocations." Slum rehabilitation schemes result in the
relocation of thousands of informal dwellers in Mumbai on a constant
basis, yet little government recognition is given to the dislocation imposed
on the communities. In a city where work and home are so closely tied,
relocation often results in the very deprivation of livelihood the Olga Tellis
judgment sought to prevent. Though levels of employment in pavement
settlements and slums are high, both among men and women, family
income is often at subsistence levels2 19 such that the cost of transportation to
and from work is prohibitive.o
Finally, the Slum Areas Act protects only those informal dwellers who
have lived in their dwellings continuously since before the legislatively
stipulated cut-off date." More recent immigrants, builders, or purchasers
will not be protected. The cut-off date is itself a highly controversial
211. Swami, supra note 209.
212. Nijman, supra note 15 at 80.
213. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 281.
214. McDougall, supra note 18 at 38-39.
215. The scheme does not take account of the size of the slum-dwelling in the provision of
the new apartment. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 281.
216. Nijman writes that the average number of dwellers per Mumbai's (one room) chawl is
6.3, with at times up to 20 people living in one dwelling. Nijman, supra note 15, at 75.
217. O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 280.
218. Dana Clark, The World Bank and Development-Induced Displacement in South Asia, 4
BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 215, 216 (1997); Michael Cernea, Understanding and Preventing
Impoverishment from Displacement: Reflections on the State of Knowledge, in UNDERSTANDING
IMPOVERISHMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 13,21-22 (C.
McDowell, ed., 1996); Sue Emmott, "Dislocation," Shelter, and Crisis: Afghanistan's Refugees and
Notions of Home, 4 GENDER & DEv. 31, 34 (1996).
219. Swaminathan, supra note 38, at 134-35.
220. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 636; O'Hare et al., supra note 4, at 275-76.
221. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, § 3-Y(1).
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judicial and legislative creation to which the analysis now turns.
B. The Cut-off Date
The cut-off date is a legislatively established date, codified in Section
3Y(1) of the Slum Areas Act,22 and represents an important watershed for
informal settlers. Those who can establish continuous residence in their
dwelling since prior to the cut-off date are entitled to both substantive and
procedural protection. Most importantly, they are entitled to rehabilitation
and compensation in the case of eviction or demolition.2 2
Nevertheless, the cut-off date is a controversial and much contested
concept. The first problem with employing the cut-off date is one of proof.
In order to prove residence before the cut-off date, the informal settler
must have the relevant government documentation identifying address
and length of continuous residence, proved by an identity card, which is
identified in the Slum Areas Act as a "photo pass."m22 However, due to their
very informality, slum and pavement colonies often exist outside the
structures of official government recognition.2 Not all informal settlers are
able to gain access to the necessary documentation.26 Many settlers who
have built on private rather than government land have never been issued
photo-passes,2" making it impossible for them to take advantage of the
protections of the Slum Areas Act. At times, the government has acted to
demolish slums even where residents possess the relevant documentation,
claiming that the residents obtained the photo-passes by fraudulent
means.' Schemes relying on standardized documentation are difficult to
operate in an informal sector.
Second, many argue that cut-off dates unavoidably breach human
rights because they grant protection on a discriminatory basis.229 The dates
are arbitrarily set by the state, normally in the run-up to an election.2 In
addition, it has been argued that the concept of a cut-off date may be open
to constitutional challenge, for, as Justice Ramaswamy pointed out in
Nawab Khan, "the Constitution provides to all citizens fundamental rights
to travel, settle down and reside in any part of Bharat [India] and none
have right to prevent their settlement."" The cut-off date can also be
222. Currently, the date stands at January 1, 1995. Id. § 3-Y(1).
223. Id. Chapter I-B; Infra Part V.A.
224. Id. § 3-X(b).
225. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 181.
226. Ramanathan, supra note 19, at 2911.
227. Anupama Katakam, Ground Realities, FRONTLINE MAG., June 16-29, 2007, 2.
228. See, e.g., "Yeh Hamara Bambai Hai" Is the Cry at Azad Maidan, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 2,
2005, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1009736.cms; Dilip
D'Souza, Cut-off by the Date, INDIA TOGETHER, Feb. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/feb/ddz-demolish.htm.
229. See D'Souza, supra note 228 ("[Tlhis peculiar notion of a cut-off date ... applies only
to slums. Middle-class blocks of flats can flout building codes and FSI rules and be built on the
back of serious bribery, but they never have cut-off dates applied to them.").
230. See generally id.
231. Ahmedabad Mun. Copr. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 152, 163. See
162 [Vol. 13
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argued to criminalize people, rather than dwellings. 2 In sum, although the
cut-off date represents a repressive tool of social control, it also provides
concrete legal entitlements to the city's informal dwellers, and forms a
point of political action around which informal settlers regularly mobilize.
As the preceding points suggest, the cut-off date is far from neutral,
but is widely used as a political device. Political parties, for whom informal
settlements represent important "vote banks,"233 regularly manipulate the
cut-off date in election campaigns, during which time political concessions
for later cut-off dates are a powerful vote buyer.' More sinisterly, during a
recent election campaign, one political party promised to move the cut-off
date forward from 1995 to 2000.235 This promise generated high support for
the party in informal settlements, and the party was duly elected.
However, once elected, the party denied its election promise and went
ahead with a demolition drive in the informal settlements.3 Nevertheless,
the issue of moving the cut-off date forward will not go quietly. The
government has agreed to later cut-off dates in some "special" projects
such as the Mumbai airport resettlement project." Meanwhile, based on
government promises, the press now reports Maharashtra's cut-off date as
2000,' and government practice currently appears to be "careful not to
touch" those slums erected between 1995 and 2000." The codified cut-off
date remains January 1, 1995,240 and thus the protections currently afforded
to informal dwellings built between 1995 and 2000 are subject to the
changing moods of Mumbai's politicians, rather than protected by a legal
entitlement. Moreover, legal impediments to the extension of the cut-off
date exist, given that in 2001, the State Government filed an affidavit with
the Bombay High Court stating that "it would not extend the cut-off date
also Balakrishnan, supra note 92, at 31.
232. D'Souza, supra note 228.
233. Nijman, supra note 15, at 78.
234. Parag Rabade writes that the Congress-NCP government "which till then never got
much support in Mumbai - decided to extend the cut off date to the year 2000 for more
votes." Parag Rabade, Mumbai Wilts Under Vote Bank Politics, DECCAN HERALD, Nov. 2, 2008,
available at
http://archive.deccanherald.com/Content/Nov22008/panorama2008110198309.asp.
235. D'Souza, supra note 228; Rabade, supra note 234.
236. The government attempted to pass off the promise of a date change as a printing
mistake in its campaign materials, despite having campaigned on the issue. Interview with
Anonymous NAPM Activist in Mumbia (Oct. 16, 2007) (notes on file with Author). See also
D'Souza, supra note 228. Similarly, in 1995, the Shiv Sena used the promise of free housing to 4
million slum dwellers to see itself elected in the city, but fewer than eighty apartment blocks
had been built by 1999. Gandy, supra note 26, at 123.
237. SUNDAR BURRA, SLUM TURBULENCE AT MUMBAI AIRPORT, SHACK/SLUM DWELLERS
INTERNATIONAL, REPORT No: 104 (May, 11 2007) available at
http://www.sdinet.org/reports2/rep104.htm.
238. Clara Lewis, Slum Rebab Cut-Off Now 2000, TIMES OF INDIA, June 18, 2009, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Slum-rehab-cut-off-
now2000/articleshow/4669036.cms.
239. Clara Lewis, State in Bind over Cut-Off Date for Slums, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 20 2005,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/city/mumbai/State-in-bind-over-cut-
off-date-for-slums/articleshow/997184.cms.
240. Slum Areas Act, supra note 20, § 3-Y(1).
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of January 1, 1995 and would remove all encroachers expeditiously." 24'
Despite the problems inherent in the Slum Areas Act, and those
brought about by lack of political will or by corruption and fraud in its
implementation, the importance of the Act should not be discounted. It has
provided protection for millions of Mumbai's informally housed. One
example of the protection it has offered emerges from the Dharavi area,
currently the subject of a massive redevelopment project.242 The informal
residents of Dharavi have used a combination of political and legal
strategies based around the Slum Areas Act to improve their bargaining
power and protect themselves from powerful opposing interests. The
residents have been able to use the courts to enforce a cut-off date five
years later than that applied elsewhere in Mumbai,m and have also forced
the government to consider increasing the size of the rehabilitation
properties from 225 to 400 square feet. 24 4
The example of Dharavi represents the strangely contradictory position
of the informal settlers in Mumbai. Popular democracy gives them, at
times, great power, but they remain intensely vulnerable and socially
marginalized. Among these vulnerabilities is the risk that the protections
afforded by the courts may be stripped away. This risk is considered in the
next Part, in the context of the emerging environmental jurisprudence of
the Indian Supreme Court.
VI. SHIFTING DISCOURSES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE INFORMAL SETTLER:
ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT, MODERNITY
The jurisprudence crafting a right to shelter and housing from the right
to life represents a powerful judicial statement on a right to life with
dignity. It has also resulted in important procedural guarantees being
granted to the informal settlements through legislative action and through
the ability to move the court for relief, thus delaying evictions. However,
the protections offered through this line of cases may not be as stable as
they at first appear. More recent judgments handed down from the
Supreme Court have moved away from the expression of Constitutional
norms ensuring a life of dignity for the very poor, towards the protection
of the interests of other sectors of society.
The most severe challenge to the judicial protections afforded to
informal dwellers under the right to life emerges not from a retreat from
judicial activism, or a change of heart about protecting a multitude of
human goods and needs within the right to life in Article 21. Rather, the
rights to housing and shelter gained under Article 21 are being tested in the
face of competing social interests. This Part provides an analysis of this
241. Lewis, supra note 239.
242. SLUM REHABILITATION AUTHORTY, DHARAVI REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT, available at
http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/Dharavi.htm.
243. Meena Menon, Supreme Court Order Cheers Dharavi Residents, THE HINDU, Apr. 6,
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shifting discourse in three particular contexts. The first is the emerging
discourse of the right to a clean environment within the right to life,
discussed in Part VI.A. Part VI.B then examines the discourses of
modernity and urbanization surfacing in the cases on rural development
projects, specifically the controversial Narmada River dams. In Part VI.C,
the article considers the discourse of Mumbai as a "world class city" as
reflected in recent cases and manifestations of government policy on the
place and visibility of informal settlers in the city itself.
A. The Right to A Clean Environment: A "Green" Agenda Human
Rights Discourse
One striking example of the changing judicial approach to the housing
rights of informal settlers is the movement for the right to a clean
environment as a facet of the right to life. In the emerging environmental
cases, informal settlers are characterized unsympathetically, at times, as
wholly unworthy of constitutional protection.
The broad judicial conception of the right to life has opened up space
for "civil society groups"24 5 to make claims under the right to life. These
civil society groups are normally formed by members of India's
bourgeoning urban middle classes,' and represent powerful interest
groups with significant lobbying skills, often supported by international
agencies or by the state itself.24 7 Several of these groups have recently
undertaken court-based activism to argue that the right to a clean
environment falls within a right to life,248 pursuing what has been
characterized as a "green agenda" of environmental sustainability, as
opposed to a "brown agenda" focused on the immediate needs of the
poor.2
In Mumbai, much of this activism has centered on the Borivili, or
Sanjay Gandhi, National Park, which lies within the city. The park covers
an area of 103 square kilometers,' and is an important wild space and
habitat for leopards and other fauna, as well as a source of fresh water for
Mumbai' 1 However, tens of thousands of people have settled and built
informal neighborhoods within the park. In fact, the park is now home
245. Activists in Mumbai working on behalf of the poor rejected the application of the
term "civil society" to their organizations, preferring "pro-poor people's movement" or
"grassroots organization." The term "civil society" in Mumbai normally refers to groups
arising from the middle classes, pursuing agendas which often contradict the interests of
grassroots NGOs or the poor. Interview with Anonymous Youth for Unity and Voluntary
Action Activist in Mumbia (Oct. 18, 2007) (notes on file with Author).
246. Gandy, supra note 26, at 116.
247. Id.
248. The Bombay Environmental Action Group [BEAG] is an example of such an
organization. See Bombay Envtl. Action Group & Another v. A.R. Bharati, Deputy
Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi Nat'l Park, Borivili & Others (2004) (5) LJSOFT 951 26
Bombay H. C. of Judicature (Writ Petition No. 305 of 1995).
249. Zrah, supra note 202, at 122.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 123.
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both to private dwellings and to industrial and commercial enterprises,
including a government run bacon factory, and several quarries.2
Environmental groups have responded by petitioning the courts to remove
the residents, who they have characterized as illegal "encroachers,"
responsible for polluting open spaces and damaging the ecology. 3
The litigation over the "encroachments" on Borivili National Park
stretched from the mid 1990s to 2003."' Finally, in Bombay Environmental
Action Group and Another v. A.R. Bharati and Others,' the High Court of
Bombay made a joint determination of the many writ petitions before the
Court, in a unanimous judgment written by Justice Thakker. The Court
stressed that the Bombay Environmental Action Group was "acting in aid
of a purpose high on the national agenda" and that their "concern for
environment, ecology, and the wild should, therefore, be shared by the
Government and authorities."s' Accordingly, the Court ordered the
relocation of the 33,000 "protected occupiers", 7 who could prove their
residence in the National Park before the cut-off date,7 and the eviction of
the inhabitants who could not prove their residence before this date.'
Protected occupiers were to be provided with alternate dwellings,
albeit at significant distances from their present residences,2 6 and at
significant cost to themselves.261 Occupiers without photo-passes, on the
other hand, were characterized as trespassers. In a sharp divergence from
Olga Tellis, the Court held that the authorities were not required to act in
accordance with "procedure known as law" when dealing with these
residents.262 They held that:
[A] person who has no right whatsoever, or who is unable to show
any authority on the basis of which he is in possession or is found
to be on property illegally or is a rank trespasser, cannot invoke the
principle [of "settled possession"] and argue that he cannot be
dispossessed.26
The characterization of these occupiers as trespassers, and thus as
falling outside the procedural protections of the Constitution's Article 21,
252. Id. at 125-26.
253. Lyla Bavadam, Encroaching on a Lifeline, FRONTLINE, Feb,. 15-28, 2003, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2004/stories/20030228002609200.htm.
254. Zirah, supra note 202, at 126. But some issues remain pending, indicating the ongoing
nature of the contestation of these rights. Id. at 127.
255. Bombay Envtl. Action Group & Another v. A.R. Bharati, Deputy Conservator of
Forest, Sanjay Gandhi Nat'1 Park, Borivili & Others (2004) (5) LJSOFT 951 26 Bombay H. C. of
Judicature (Writ Petition No. 305 of 1995).
256. Id. para. 146.
257. Id. para. 39.
258. Id. para. 10(o).
259. Id. para. 10(k), 10(m).
260. Id. para. 19(10)(o).
261. Id. para, 26(8).
262. Id. para. 199.
263. Id. para. 200.
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represents a significant diminution in the rights of informal dwellers in
Mumbai, as well as a considerable shift in judicial rhetoric on the place and
worth of slum and pavement dwellers in the city.
The role of the Court in this case, although important, should not be
overestimated. The judicial pronouncements represent only one aspect of
this political, legal, and social struggle, which involves various levels of
government, as well as the competing interests of government
departments.26 In fact, although the relocation and eviction of the
"encroachers" was eventually sanctioned by the Court, many of the
evictions were carried out before the final Court order, and well in advance
of the implementation of the relocation scheme.'
The efforts of civil society groups have extended beyond challenges to
the legality of informal settlements. These groups have, in some instances,
made explicit attacks on the citizenship rights of informal dwellers. For
example, in 2004, a group of "prominent" 26 citizens of Mumbai petitioned
the courts to deny slum dwellers the right to vote, arguing that it was
"necessary" to update the electoral list, "deleting all names of encroachers
on railway compounds, footpaths, playgrounds and other places reserved
for public purposes."2 67 In 2005, the city's Municipal Corporation
approached the Chief Electoral Officer to have the residents of demolished
slums struck from the voting register.26
While these civil society environmental efforts may appear to be forms
of social engagement, they can in fact be described as a form of social
severance, what Ellison and Burrows identify as "a proactive politics, but a
form of politics that has the key objective of disengagement."26 That is, the
city elites and middle classes seek to retreat from the trouble of the poor;
they reject the reality that these problems are problems of the city as a
whole. In so doing, they not only reject the social citizenship of the poor,
but also manifest their own diminished role as social citizens.
These civil society endeavors, based on the "perception that the poor
are illegal anyway, [and] so have no rights,"27o hint at the deep role of rights
in social belonging and membership. That is, human rights are not only
instrumental, but also constitutive of our full social and legal
personhood.271 Human rights are the contemporary language through
264. Z6rah, supra note 202, at 127.
265. Id. at 130 (explaining that while demolitions were supposed to be undertaken only
after relocation had been achieved, demolition drives began in the early 1990s, and in 1998
alone, 22,000 homes were demolished).
266. Sainath, supra note 58.
267. Darryl D'Monte, Banning the Majority from Voting, INFOCHANGE, Oct. 2004,
http://infochangeindia.org/200410205457/Governance/Analysis/Banning-the-majority-
from-voting. html (quoting counsel in the case).
268. Sainath, supra note 58.
269. Nick Ellison & Rogers Burrows, New Spaces of (Dis)engagement? Social Politics, Urban
Technologies and the Rezoning of the City, 22 HOUSING STUD. 295, 306 (2007).
270. Ramanathan, supra note 19, at 2912.
271. See Costas Douzinas, Justice and Human Rights in Postmodernity, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN RIGHTs 115, 121 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996).
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which claims to one's membership within humanity are made.m Moreover,
their recognition by others, including the state, is the recognition of the
humanity of the person.2" Holding human rights is, thus, "synonymous
with being human."27 4
In Mumbai, when civil society groups campaign to deny not only the
rights of informal settlers to occupy particular plots of land, but also to be
acknowledged as citizens of Mumbai, they attempt to erase the informal
dwellers' existence as part of Mumbai itself. These maneuvers are an
explicit example of the denial of humanity which can be wrought through
the refusal to grant or recognize rights, 275 as well as a manifestation of the
desire, as Ellison and Burrows evocatively suggest, to seal the poor off
from mainstream society.276 For, if the rights of informal settlers in Mumbai
are denied, it is both a symptom of, and a permission for, their compatriots
to cease to value them - in fact, to cease to see them as human beings at all.
As Williams writes, "[flor the historically disempowered, the conferring of
rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of humanity: rights imply a
respect which places one within the referential range of self and others,
which elevates one's status from human body to social being." m The
corollary of this inclusion in the referential range of the social being is the
denial of the humanity of informal dwellers, what Baxi identifies as the
production of "rightlessness" by "the acts of bare sovereignty that simply
refuses to accept certain claims to being human and having human rights
in the first place." 278
Although the Supreme Court has so far resisted the desires of wealthy
Mumbaikers to disenfranchise informal settlers, as the Borivili National
Park litigation illustrates, the justices have found environmental arguments
persuasive and, in recognizing a right to a clean and healthy environment,
have ordered eviction of thousands of informal dwellers, not just in
Mumbai but in rapidly growing cities across India.2 7
While it is clear that the right to live in a clean and healthy
environment can come within such an expansive interpretation of the right
to life as that recognized in the Indian jurisprudence,2a what is startling is
the way the environmental cases that fall under the right to life have been
accompanied by a profound change in the judicial discourse regarding
informal dwellers. It is to this aspect of the cases that the article now turns.
The cases deriving from Olga Tellis have not been formally overruled,
272. Id. at 123.
273. WILLIAMS, supra note 171, at 416; See Douzinas, supra note 271, at 127-28.
274. Douzinas, supra note 271, at 123.
275. Williams, supra note 171, at 416.
276. Ellison & Burrows, supra note 269, at 306-07.
277. Williams, supra note 171, at 416.
278. Upendra Baxi, The Protection of Human Rights and the Production of Human
Rightlessness, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN
JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA 384, 386 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 2006).
279. See Almitra Patel v. Union of India A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, discussed infra this Part.
280. As Reddy writes, "Article 21 is pregnant with many kinds of individual and social
rights of various attributes." G.B. Reddy, Supreme Court and Judicial Activism: An Overview of its
Impact on Constitutionalism, 3 Sup. Ct. J. 19, 20 (2001).
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but the judicial protections accorded in the cases have been gradually
narrowed. For example, while Olga Tellis dealt with broad principles,
Ahmedabad v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan qualified the protections, moving
away from the focus on the rights of informal dwellers towards the duties
of the government to keep the pavements clear and provide for orderly
management of slum clearance.
The housing rights cases are thus not immune to the trend in public
interest litigation that sees judges struggling to balance the competing
interests of the middle classes, the poor, and the state." In many of these
cases, the poor are receiving less judicial sympathy, accompanied by the
narrowing of their rights. For example in Olga Tellis, then Chief Justice
Chandrachud's characterization of pavement dwellers, though tinged with
disgust,' is also filled with pity and at times with respect. He describes
many of the informal dwellers as pursuing "occupations which are humble
but honorable,"' and stresses that they "do not claim the right to dwell on
pavements or in slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is
illegal, immoral or contrary to public interest."m
The judgment also takes into consideration the structural causes of
inequality and poverty underlying the living situation of the pavement
dwellers, noting that:
Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have
deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive
migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate
because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The
motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and
homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle
for life.2
Moreover, the Chief Justice described the drive to live on the
pavements as one of compulsion, writing that
"[i]t is a notorious fact of contemporary life in metropolitan cities,
that no person in his senses would opt to live on a pavement or in
a slum, if any other choice, were available to him. Anyone who
cares to have even a fleeting glance at the pavement or slum
281. See supra Part IV. The most recent ruling, Chameli Singh, represents a "pro-poor"
interpretation of the housing rights issue. Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Predesh. (1996) 2
S.C.C. 549,553.
282. Kothari, supra note 89; Reddy, supra note 71, at 21.
283. For example, see Justice Chandrachud's description of the pavement dwellers as
those who "exist in the midst of filth and squalor, which has to be seen to be believed." Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 183.
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dwellings will see that they are the very hell on earth.""
However, this is no longer the leading judicial perception of slum and
pavement dwellers. Almitra Patel v. Union of India,' an environmental case
brought as public interest litigation to force the Delhi authorities to
conceive and implement a solid waste management plan,m9 presents a
salient example. In this case, Justice Kirpal, whose influence on the
changing judicial discourse on informal settlers has been strikingo
delivered the judgment of the Court. He placed the blame for Delhi's
pollution problems on the shoulders of the slum dwellers, who, he wrote,
have "no care for hygiene""' and whose "unauthorised colonies",2
complicate the process of dealing with the city's waste. 2 He stated that:
The number of slums has multiplied in the last few years by
geometrical proportion. Large areas of public land, in this way, are
usurped for private use free of cost .... The promise of free land,
at the taxpayers cost ... is a proposal which attracts more land
grabbers. Rewarding an encroacher on public land with [a] free
alternate site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket.... [Miore and
more slums are coming into existence. Instead of 'Slum Clearance'
there is 'Slum Creation' in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic
waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. This
can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by preventing
the growth of slums.24
The Court accordingly ordered that the landholders remove the
informal settlers and release the land free of charge to the Delhi
authorities to be used as land-fill and compost sites.96 As Ramanathan
notes, the "cynicism immanent in the attribution of criminality to the slum-
dwellers because they had not paid the price of [the] land, while directing
that land be released free of cost for garbage dumping, was not lost on
many."27 The case illustrates a radical re-characterization of the informal
dwellers. Whilst Olga Tellis portrayed informal dwellers as struggling
287. Id. at 199.
288. Almitra Patel v. Union of India A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256.
289. Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access,
Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 293, 296-97 (2007).
290. See infra Section VI.B.
291. Almitra Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1258-59.
295. The sites were to be handed to the authorities "free from all encumbrances." Id. at
1261.
296. Id.
297. Ramanathan, supra note 100.
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citizens eking out a living in the most abominable circumstances,29 the
cases now depict slum and pavement dwellers as opportunists. They are
seen as "economic migrants" at best, criminals at worst, and in either case
as both more troublesome and less valuable than garbage.
B. Rural Development: Discourses of Urbanization and
Modernization
While the Almitra Patel judgment, discussed in the previous Part,
represents only one judicial statement in ongoing public interest
litigation,9 it illustrates the tensions between urban and rural
development, which emerge as an underlying theme in many of these
cases. This theme can be illustrated by a discussion of the most contentious
of India's rural development cases, the litigation surrounding the building
of the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada River.
The damming of the Narmada was "[c]onceived in the spirit of post-
independence nation-building,"" in which dams have played a crucial
symbolic role in India's industrialization, modernization, and
development."' The system of dams, built across three state borders,32
promised power, water, and irrigation, but the project quickly became
embroiled in a sustained wave of environmental and social protests,
focusing in part on the fact that 25 to 40 million people would be displaced
by the Sardar Sarovar dam alone?
The litigation and political struggle surrounding the building of the
dam is torturously complex?' However, the situation is important because
the judicial approach in the most recent Supreme Court judgment
illustrates the underlying, though at times obscured, link between rural
development, forced displacement, and the rhetoric of modernization.
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others,' handed down by
the Supreme Court in 2000, has caused dismay from both
298. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 at 183-84.
299. The Municipal Solid Waste Management litigation has been before the courts for 11
years, and has resulted in 50 related court orders. The case is a prime example of the judicial
governance function of the Indian courts. See generally Rajamani, supra note 289.
300. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 123 (2003).
301. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global
Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 345, 355
(2005); Gandy, supra note 26, at 114.
302. Paul Routledge, Voices of the Dammed: Discursive Resistance Amidst Erasure in the
Narmada Valley, India, 22 POL. GEOGRAPHY 243, 244 (2003); Rajagopal, supra note 301, at 355,
358.
303. RAJAGOPAL, supra note 300, at 123.
304. See generally Komala Ramachandra, Sardar Sarovar: An Experience Retained?, 19 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 275 (2006), and Philippe Cullet, Human Rights and Displacement: The Indian Supreme
Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar in International Perspective, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 973 (2001);
RAJAGOPAL, supra note 300.
305. A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751.
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environmentalists and social rights activists.' In this high profile litigation,
the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the relocation and
resettlement of thousands of Indians - many of whom are tribal and
marginalized by poverty or social status" - would amount to a violation of
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 0 Justice Kirpal, writing for the
majority," noted that "displacement of the tribals and other persons would
not per se result in the violation of their fundamental or other rights.',3
1 o
This statement is in direct contravention of clear international legal
standards which hold forced displacement to be a prima facie violation of
the right to housing.311 Justice Kirpal further suggested that the
displacement of rural or tribal peoples by the construction of the dam and
their relocation to rehabilitation sites would have a beneficial effect. He
argued that due to rehabilitation "they are better off than what they were.
At the rehabilitation sites they will have more and better amenities than
which they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the
main stream of the society will lead to betterment and progress."312 In fact,
Roy notes, the argument that displacement is actually a "positive
intervention, a way of relieving acute deprivation" is repeatedly asserted."
In this way, she argues, the costs of modernization are portrayed as
benefits."'
Employing the rhetoric of modernization and progress, the statement
appears divorced from any recognition of the established causal links
between the displacement of India's rural poor and the growth of urban
slum settlements.31s Thus the Narmada litigation sits uncomfortably with
housing rights cases such as Olga Tellis and Chameli Singh. More
troublingly, it also sits uncomfortably with Justice Kirpal's own judgment
in Almitra Patel." In Almitra Patel, the judgment clearly fails to take account
of the fact that pushing millions of people from their rural lands and
livelihoods is inextricably linked to the movement of people to the cities,
where they are forced to seek housing in the informal sector while
struggling to recreate a livelihood. This is despite the fact that in the
306. Routledge, supra note 302, at 254-56.
307. Id. at 250-52.
308. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751 at
3787.
309. The majority of the court was composed of Justice Kirpal and Chief Justice A.S.
Anand. Justice Bharucha dissented, contending that an adequate environmental impact
assessment had not been completed. Id. at 3752.
310. Id. at 3787.
311. Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cult. Rights, General Comment 7: The Right to Adequate Housing
(Art 11(1): Forced Evictions, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV (May 20, 1997).
312. A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3751 at 3787.
313. Arundhati Roy, The Cost of Living: The Narmada Dam and the Indian State, in
EXPERIENCING THE STATE 53,64 (L.I. Rudolph & J. K. Jacobsen eds., 2006).
314. Id.
315. Gandy writes that "the rural water crisis and escalating rural-urban tensions over
access to water resources is a significant spur to new waves of migration to the city." Gandy,
supra note 26, at 118.
316. Almira Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256.
317. See generally Prafulla C. Mishra, Right to Shelter: A Human Right Perspective, 40 J.
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Narmada case, such dislocation is envisaged as socially beneficial.
The Narmada judgment brought together environmentalists,
impoverished farmers, NGO groups protesting displacement, and tribal
populations.31 8 However, in many cases involving the violation of the right
to housing such as Chameli Singh,"' and in many environmental rights cases
such as the Borivili National Park litigation, the environment is pitted
against the lives and rights of informal settlers.3 20 In these cases, a clear class
dimension emerges: the middle classes are aligned with the protection of
the environment, while the poor are characterized as the generators of
public waste.3 21
This is despite the fact that the waste output of the high and middle-
income groups in Indian cities is far in excess of the waste output of the
informal dwellers. One study found that "per capita waste generation per
day in Delhi is 420g for those in the high income group, 240g for those in
the middle income group, 150g for those in the lower middle income
group, and only 80g for those in the JJ clusters [slums]."' Despite their
high population density, informal settlers in fact have "lighter ecological
footprints" than formal settlements.3 Those who have the least, though
they may be the most visible of the city's citizens, in fact have the smallest
physical impact on its environment. Yet in Almitra Patel it was the "garbage
and solid waste generated by these slums" that the court required "to be
dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority."324
It is also worthy of note that the middle classes and the elites have
"encroached" on various areas of the India's cities, including Mumbai's
Borivili National Park, without being subjected to similar rhetoric or legal
removal strategies."' Thus as Mahadevia and Narayanan note, "the
argument about violation of law by the slum-dwellers is just an expression
of intolerance towards the poor, not intolerance towards the violation of
law."3 26 Moreover, the categorization of informal dwellers as "polluters"
has objectionable overtones given India's history of a discriminatory caste
system in which the "lowest" castes are considered "polluted" and thus
INDIAN L. INST. 230, 238 (1998).
318. Routledge, supra note 302, at 254-56.
319. (1996) 2 S.C.C. 549.
320. See, e.g., Writ Petition for Respondent, Bombay Envt'l. Action Group, (1995) (Bombay
H.C.) (No. 305); see also the Delhi Vehicular Pollution Case M.C. Metha v. Union of India Writ
Petition No. 13029 of 1985; Almitra Patel v. Union of A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256.
321. Ramanathan, supra note 19, at 2910.
322. Rajamani, supra note 289, at 302 (citing COWI & KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSULTANTS, FEASIBILITY STUDY AND MASTER PLAN FOR OPTIMAL WASTE TREATMENT AND
DISPOSAL FOR THE ENTIRE STATE OF DELHI BASED ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SOLUTIONS
(Apr. 2004)).
323. Id. citing COWI & Kadam Evironmental Consultants, FEASIBILITY STUDY AND MASTER
PLAN FOR OPTIMAL WASTE TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL FOR THE ENTIRE STATE OF DELHI BASED
ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP SOLUTIONS (2004).
324. Almitra Patel v. Union of India A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1259.
325. Z6rah, supra note 202, at 129-30.
326. Darshini Mahadevia & Harini Narayanan, Shanghaing Mumbai-Politics of Evictions and
Resistance in Slum Settlements 32-33 (Ctr. for Dev. Alternatives, Working Paper No. 7, 1999).
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317excluded from many aspects of society.
C. Competing Visions of Mumbai: The Discourse of a "World Class"
City
India's cities play a particular role in the development of a "modern"
India. According to Blank, the city "has come to represent modernity, and
urbanization is often understood as the symbol of the departure of human
societies from traditional ways of living.",3  Cities signify "the frontier of
human civilization."3 29 The tension in the cases pitting a right to clean
environment against a right to housing and shelter reveals competing
visions of the role of urban development in India's future. On the one
hand, India's cities are invoked as places in which every person - no matter
how poor and marginalized - can seek a new life. On the other, cities are
called upon to fulfill a vision in which efficiency, cleanliness, and planned
modernization are the signs of the way forward to a new India.
Delhi is reinventing itself as the capital city of an emerging superpower
and, as Roy writes, must be "dressed up to look the part."" Bangalore is
India's silicon city, consciously remodeling itself as the center of a high
technology global service industry.3 ' But Mumbai has always worn the
mantle of India's most modern and urbanized city. 3 2 It is the "gateway" to
India," and as its financial hub, it represents India to the forces of capital
and global trade.' Mumbai is the face India turns toward the world.
Mumbai is positioning itself within a tradition of a rationalist vision of
urbanity, where efficiency is placed foremost, planning triumphs over
nature, and administration, accountancy, and the cash economy render a
valuable life objectively measureable. But this ideal is in striking
opposition to the current reality and projected future of cities,3 which
(especially in the global south) are characterized by "extreme forms of
social polarization and spatial fragmentation."3 7
327. Smita Narula, Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: The "Untouchable" Condition in Critical
Race Perspective, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 255, 272 (2008-2009).
328. Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 875, 886 (2006).
329. Id.
330. Arundhati Roy, Scandal in the Palace, OUTLOOK INDIA MAG., Oct. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20071001&fname=Sabharwal+%28F%29&s
id=.1. As Justice Kirpal opined in Almitra Patel, Delhi is India's capital, and "should be its
showpiece." A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1256, 1258.
331. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 172.
332. Patel, supra note 3, at 328.
333. Richard Grant & Jan Nijman, Globalization and the Corporate Geography of Cities in the
Less-Developed World, 92.2 ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 320, 320
(2002).
334. See Id.
335. See John Friedmann, Cities in Social Transformation, 4 COMP. STUD. Soc'Y & HIST. 86,
88-89 (1961).
336. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 2-11 (detailing rapid urbanisation and cataloguing its
effects worldwide).
337. Gandy, supra note 26, at 126.
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Visions of Social Transformation
Nowhere is the shift towards a liberal, market-friendly, modem India
clearer than in the state's vision for a new Mumbai. In 2003 McKinsey, the
international consultancy firm, was commissioned to produce a new plan
for the city?43 Their report, Vision Mumbai: Transforming Mumbai into a
World-Class City, embodies a plan to create a gleaming new city by 2013.3
Through this vision, Mumbai will be "transformed" into another Shanghai,
Sydney, or New York."o Vision Mumbai proposes to boost economic
growth," improve and expand mass and private transport infrastructure,32
"dramatically increase" low-income housing availability and
affordability,M  upgrade pollution controls as well as basic and essential
services," streamline building approvalsM 5 and make government more
efficient by making key departments operate like corporations?4 ' While
some of these improvements may appear uncontroversial, the vision
remains highly contested, both for the city it imagines and the processes it
advocates.
The most direct impacts on the poor and marginalized will result from
the plan's objective of reducing the number of slum dwellers from the
current fifty to sixty percent to ten to twenty percent of the city's overall
population." Vision Mumbai contemplates achieving this objective through
increase of land availability by fifty to seventy percent,M8 the construction
of 800,000 new low cost housing units to rehabilitate existing slum
dwellers,; and the provision of three hundred thousand new low cost
units to meet other demand. With more than six million Mumbaikers
living in informal settlements, the numbers suggest that Vision Mumbai's
targets for rehabilitation fall far short of existing need if their objective is to
be met.
The reduction in informal dwellings and their replacement with formal
sector housing is to be achieved mainly through market incentives and by
encouraging private enterprise? This is perhaps not surprising, given that
338. The Report was commissioned by Bombay First, with the "active participation" of the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development
Authority and the Government of Maharashtra. McKINSEY INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANTS,
VISION MUMBAi: TRANSFORMING MUMBAI INTO A WORLD-CLASS CITY, SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS iv (2003) [hereinafter VISION MUMBAII.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 13.
342. Id. at 16.
343. Id. at 19.
344. Id. at 23.
345. Id. at 27.
346. Id. at 1-2. See also the summary of the key recommendations at McKinsey and
Company India Office Website, McKinsey and Co., Vision Mumbai,
http:/ /www.mckinsey.com/locations/india/communityservice/visionmumbai/ (last visited
Dec. 8, 2008).
347. VISION MUMBAI, supra note 338, at 20.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 21.
350. Id. at 22.
351. See Id. at 20-22.
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the Report itself represents the privatization of public policy,352 and is
therefore a manifestation of the shift to the predominance of "market logic"
in India's governance. In the meantime, however, the government has
asserted its public role and taken more immediate steps to reduce the
number of informal dwellers, undertaking an unprecedented demolition
drive in even the powerful and well established slums, which has resulted
in the eviction of over three hundred thousand people." Perhaps the
authorities are acting in the knowledge that the redevelopment of one of
the Vision Mumbai Report's "model" cities, Shanghai, involved the forced
relocation of one and a half million people.'
But the demolition of informal housing and the planned reconstruction
of Mumbai as a "formal" city is only the physical signifier of Vision
Mumbai's deeper impact on the informal dwellers. Such city regeneration
projects, as Davis notes, entail fundamental reorganizations of the city's
spatial characteristics, "involving a drastic diminution of the intersections
between the lives of the rich and the poor, which transcends traditional
social segregation and urban fragmentation."' They are also the
manifestations of a tradition that claims that the "underdeveloped" or
"folk" regions of a city are "in the city but not a part of it" thus envisaging
the city as the natural and exclusive preserve of the elite.'
And in fact, Vision Mumbai represents an idealization of the city in
which the informally housed are rendered largely invisible. Reading the
report, and examining related plans such as the Slum Rehabilitation
Authority's Dharavi Redevelopment Project, 7 it is not difficult to see the
authors' imagined city of shining office towers housing Asia's pre-eminent
multinational corporations, free-flowing super highways, and ordered
parks and avenues. Vision Mumbai's front and back covers portray
Mumbai's foreshore at twilight.3 " Neon signs dot the skyline, while people
stroll on the boulevard and sit on the sea wall. A few classic Mumbai taxis
pass by on the esplanade, which is separated from the sea by an orderly
row of palms." The Slum Rehabilitation Authority's website proclaims
that the new Dharavi will have "many amenities in it; viz. wider roads,
electricity, ample water supply, playgrounds, schools, colleges, medical
centers, socio-cultural centers etc."" Photographs of the choked alleyways
of today's slum are contrasted with the orderly, white-clad high rises of the
future.' Vision Mumbai offers no hint of the bustle, chaos, and noise of the
352. With thanks to Dr. Daniel Joyce for drawing my attention to this interesting paradox.
353. Judy Whitehead & Nitin More, Revanchism in Mumbai? Political Economy of Rent Gaps
and Urban Restructuring in a Global City, 45 ECON. & POL. WKLY 2428, 2433 (2007).
354. Davis, supra note 7, at 103. These facts are unmentioned in Vision Mumbai, despite
the reliance on Shanghai as a prototype.
355. Id. at 119.
356. Friedmann, supra note 335, at 89.
357. Dharavi Redevelopment Project, supra note 242.
358. VISION MUMBAI, supra note 338.
359. Id.
360. Dharavi Redevelopment Project, supra note 242.
361. Id.; Slum Rehabilitation Authority, Dharavi Redevelopment Project,
http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/Dharavi.htm (showing choked alleyways) (last visited
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informal settlements. The pictures avoid showing the thronging crowds
who jostle for a few precious feet of space on the pavements in order to
build their houses, hawk their wares, or make their ways to the hubs of
business and transport.
Vision Mumbai closes with a plea to the reader: "Mumbai is a jewel in
the crown of not only Maharashtra but also India. The jewel has, however,
completely lost its lustre."" Only the implementation of Vision Mumbai's
recommendations "will restore that lustre."" This assertion is oddly
reminiscent of pre-Independence Bombay, a city in which participation in
civil society was strictly limited to the ruling class whose rights of
property, trade, and land ownership were protected by colonial military
force.' The exclusive colonial city, characterized by the indifference of the
city's elites to the social problems of the city as a whole;" is revived by the
government's aggressive demolition drives, its desire to control the use of
space, and the impulse to disenfranchise the informal dwellers for whom
Mumbai is currently home.
Legal cases emerging from the state of Maharashtra show that the
judiciary is not immune to this elitist vision of Mumbai. For instance, in
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,' the Supreme Court of
India held that Mumbai's Rent Control Act,67 which freezes rents at 1940s
levels," is arbitrary and unreasonable.69 Although it is widely recognized
that overly severe rent control has been detrimental to the maintenance
and creation of rental housing in Mumbai's formal sector,370 the law has
symbolic value to Mumbaikers. It represents the culmination of a pre-
Independence history of social struggles in which civic rights, including
the right to housing, were viewed as the "fundamental building blocks of
sustainable urban renewal."3 1 The judicial repudiation of the Rent Control
Act can thus be read as a repudiation of the value of that struggle.
Even when such rent control legislation is not rejected outright, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of its purpose has shifted. In Joginder Pal v.
Naval Kishore Behal,3 72 Justice Lahoti stated that, in spite of the fact that
Mumbai's rent control legislation was constructed to benefit the tenant:
May 31, 2010); Slum Rehabilitation Authority, FAQS,
http://www.sra.gov.in/htmlpages/faqs.htm (showing slums with white high-rises in
background) (last visited May 31, 2010).
362. VISION MUMBAI, supra note 338, at 32.
363. Id.
364. Hazareesingh, supra note 70, at 798-99.
365. Gandy, supra note 26, at 114.
366. A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 602.
367. The Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2000.
368. Id.
369. Malpe Vishwanath Acharya A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 602, at 617. Despite this ruling, rent control
legislation remains in force in the city. Its repeal is politically unfeasible given that "the
tenants are powerfully organized, (though relatively small in number)." See Appadurai, supra
note 2, at 638-39.
370. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 638-39.
371. Hazareesingh, supra note 70, at 811.
372. (2002) 5 S.C.C. 397.
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[Wlhile interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the
interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in
favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent
control legislations to take care of those situations where the
landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble."
In reality, urban land holdings in Mumbai are tremendously
concentrated in the hands of a small number of powerful landlords .3 1 This
is widely recognized in Mumbaif and in light of this fact, the Court's
preference for landlords over tenants is a further illustration of
jurisprudence that turns away from the needs of the poor.
Finally, the cases discussed in Parts VI.A and VI.B cannot be excluded
from an analysis of the judiciary's role in the changing discourse on
informal settlers and their place in India's future cities. The rhetoric of slum
and pavement dwellers as encroachers and polluters has been reinforced
and given legal weight in judgments such as Almitra Patel, Nawab Khan, and
the Borivili National Park litigation.
The cases analyzed here show that the judicial attitude to informal
settlers, from Olga Tellis and Chameli Singh to Almitra Patel and the Narmada
Judgment, is open to radical revision. Such judicial re-imaginings of human
rights norms can, and in this instance have, led to the reinterpretation of
rights protections and guarantees in a way that disempowers and excludes
- rather than empowers and protects - the poorest and most marginalized.
For this reason, the jurisprudence developed under the right to life may be
a shaky foundation upon which to build a house in Mumbai. Litigation for
the protection of housing rights is now recognized as a risky strategy, to be
undertaken only as a last resort.376
But the risk lies not so much in any lack of clarity in the principles
themselves, or in a retreat from judicial activism on the right to life
guaranteed by Article 21. The risk lies in the changed judicial and social
emphasis on the interests that should be protected under the Constitution
as fundamental to Indian society. The unifying theme in the recent housing
rights cases such as Nawab Khan, the environmental rights cases such as the
Borivili National Park litigation, and the rural development litigation over
the Narmada dams is the desire to remove the informal elements of the
city, and to clear the way for a planned, shining, efficient, and, most
373. Id. at 404.
374. Patel, supra note 3, at 340 (noting that fewer than 100 landlords own more than half
the vacant land in the possession of private builders in Mumbai).
375. Legislation has been introduced to prevent further land concentration. See Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, No. 33 of 1976.
376. In the words of a prominent housing rights advocate, the judicial protection of
housing rights "is a double-edged sword, because you can file a litigation on behalf of slum
dwellers, saying protect us. And in the 1980s they'd protect you. Now you file a petition on
behalf of a so-called environmental group saying there are 100,000 slum dwellers which are
encroaching please remove them, the environment is being polluted, and the Court will come
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importantly, exclusive "world class" space.
VII. REMAKING INDIA, REMAKING HUMAN RIGHTS: FACTORS UNDERLYING THE
RE-CHARACTERIZATION OF INFORMAL CITIZENS
The final Part of this paper seeks an explanation for the changing
judicial and popular discourses revealed in Part VI. What motivates the
striking change in the characterization of informal settlers, their value to
the city, and their place in it? Two main reasons appear to lie behind the
changing discourse. The first is the unstable composition of the Indian
Supreme Court. The second is the specific role that India's senior Judiciary
plays in the Indian state, and consequently, the judicial place in the quest
for a "modern" India.
The first, and most straightforward, factor behind the changing judicial
discourse on informal settlers is the alteration in the Supreme Court bench
between the earlier housing rights cases, including Olga Tellis, Shantistar
Builders, and Chameli Singh, and the more recent cases such as Nawab Khan
and Almitra Patel. Olga Tellis was decided in what can be described as the
Court's "golden period"'" of human rights protection. This was the time
during which the Supreme Court took control of the Constitution after
decades of judicial deference," and radically refigured its own role and the
judicial approach to human rights in India, especially in terms of
protections for the poor.
Yet even during this period, the influence of individual activist judges
was significant,' with a small handful of judges being instrumental to the
development of human rights for the marginalized.3o This is evident in the
cases discussed here. Justice Bhagwati and Justice Chandrachud figure
prominently in the cases creating a right to housing and shelter as an
aspect of a right to life with dignity."8 ' Justice Ramaswamy was also
responsible for significant judgments." Justice Kirpal, on the other hand,
has emerged as a key judicial figure in the re-characterization of informal
settlers as encroachers and polluters?
Meanwhile, internal debate over the appropriateness and legitimacy of
the Court's activism has remained intense?8' Moreover, a stable body of
constitutional jurisprudence is difficult to locate, given that constitutional
cases may be decided by benches of only a few judges,' and the total
377. Yash Ghai, Foreword to HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
EMPOWERMENT x (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007).
378. Austin, supra note 72, at xxiv.
379. Upendra Baxi, The Promise and Peril of Transcendental Jurisprudence: Justice Krishna
Iyer's Combat with the Production of Rightlessness in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 3,4-5 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007).
380. Id. at 4.
381. See generally Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. A.IR. 1986 S.C. 180.
382. Id.
383. See supra Part VI.
384. See Thiruvengadam, supra note 90, at 285.
385. EPP, supra note 132, at 83.
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number of judges on the Supreme Court has increased from an original
eight to the current number of twenty six,' leading to the possibility of
divergent jurisprudential principles emerging concurrently from the
appointed Bench."8 Thus, the housing rights jurisprudence developed by
the Supreme Court during the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as the product
of a specific moment in the Court's history, though the cases do remain
good law and, in some instances, are leading cases.
All court benches evolve, and this change does not necessarily lead to
the rejection of an earlier court's human rights jurisprudence. Thus, other
causes must be sought to explain the shift in discourse from the social
justice focused jurisprudence of the earlier housing rights cases, towards
case law that seeks to protect strikingly different human rights interests.
One such reason is found in the governance role of the Indian Supreme
Court within the broader Indian constitutional structure, to which the
analysis now turns.
The Indian Constitution is "more than a mere text defining the
parameters of the state ... [but is] a repository of certain values, ideals,
meaning and tradition, going beyond its instrumental use."' Thus, the
Constitution supplies the underlying societal goals and the principles of
justice for the state. As Sudarshan argues, the framers "drafted a set of
ideological norms which all parties were expected to acknowledge as
fundamental in the governance of India.""9 The Constitution was to
remove these matters from the internal strife of party politics, and to spell
out a role for the state "as an integrating and legitimizing concept that
identifies the basic values of the political community with reference to
which power and authority are expected to be exercised.""o The Indian
Constitution thus "envisages a state with the requisite 'steering' capacity
over society to fulfill its programmatic goals." 9' This requires a
government that is able to act authoritatively and decisively on broad
economic, social, and political policies.
Brass characterizes this mode of governing as "governance,"3 9 2 invoked
in the Indian context as the need to "rule, control, direct, steer, regulate,
determine, and/or restrain"" coupled with the underlying apprehension
that the issues facing India may mean it is "impossible to govern effectively
at all . . . . "3' This authoritarian definition of governance, and the anxiety
that underlies it, means that "governance" in India is often employed in a
386. Id.
387. Id. Cf. Meer, supra note 96, at 370 (on the issue of "judge shopping" in public interest
litigation).
388. R. Sudarshan, The Political Consequences of Constitutional Discourse, in 2 STATE AND
NATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL CHANGE, 55, 55-56 (T.V. Sathyamurthy ed., 1997).
389. Id. at 63.
390. Id. at 65.
391. Id. at 69.
392. Paul Brass, How Political Scientists Experienced India's Development State, in
EXPERIENCING THE STATE 110, 121 (L.I Rudolph & J.K. Jacobsen eds., 2006).
393. Id.
394. Id. at 122.
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heavy handed manner in which it is assumed that some casualties are to be
expected in the pursuit of development."'
The Supreme Court plays a noteworthy role in the governance of the
Indian State. It functions as more than a judicial review organ, and its
governance role is widely acknowledged by commentators and by the
justices themselves.9 7 Writing extra-judicially, Supreme Court Chief Justice
Balakrishnan describes the Court's "significant" contribution to good
governance in India, which he defines as "the task of running the
government effectively."' The way the Court has embraced this role can
be seen throughout the cases analyzed in this article, in which the Court
takes on responsibilities for fulfilling legislative schemes from land
acquisition to waste management and from environmental policy to slum
rehabilitation. The Court's governance function thus provides an
opportunity for creative and activist social policy to emanate legitimately
from the Court.
The implications of this governance role are particularly notable when
the Court's strength as an institution is contrasted with the weakness of the
legislative and executive branches. That is, the Supreme Court has been
described as an institution whose "Delphic pronouncements carry almost
mythical power,"" in marked contrast to the "decay" of the executive and
legislative branches of government as political institutions.' Rajagopal, for
example, describes the executive and legislature as "a failing or failed state
apparatus that proves unwilling or is incapable of carrying out its mandate
under the law and the constitution." 402 Thus, the Supreme Court's
governance task places a heavy burden on the Court to act in place of the
vacuum left by the legislature and executive, even while such a role creates
a powerful and influential position for the Court.
In light of this relationship, the Supreme Court has often worked to
uphold the central, though unfulfilled, aims and initiatives of the
legislature and executive. In this way, the Court acts in accordance with the
"logic of the state."4 o It is this relationship between the judiciary and the
other branches of government that best explains the changing judicial
characterization of Mumbai's informal settlers, as the Indian State
repositions itself in the global market as a "modern" power, with its
policies based on the liberalization, privatization, and commercialization of
Indian society.
Since the early 1990s, India's modernization and urbanization has been
based on the "market logic"" of structural adjustment policies,
395. Roy, supra note 313, at 61.
396. Mehta, supra note 181, at 110.
397. See, e.g., Balakrishnan, supra note 92, at 31.
398, Id.
399, Id. at 25.
400. Rajagopal, supra note 301, at 301.
401. Brass, supra note 392, at 122-23.
402. Rajagopal, supra note 132, at 212.
403. Id. at 203.
404. Banashree Banerjee, Security of Tenure in Indian Cities, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND:
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accompanied by "deregulation, denationalization, disinvestment and
digitalization. "'05 This logic marks a serious departure from India's
formerly tightly regulated and highly nationalized economy.4 O Many of the
planned economic reforms have not been realized." However, as Nayar
notes, it is the irreversibility"0 of the measures, coupled with their
foundation in a wholly new set of philosophical assumptions about the
Indian state and the economy, which marks the changing basis of economic
and social relations most strikingly."
The changing discourse on informal settlements, in which slum and
pavement dwellers are considered encroachers with no legitimate right to a
place in the city, illustrates India's enthusiasm for the new, "modern" State.
Such enthusiasm challenges the assertion that globalization is being forced
onto "an unwilling world."o On the contrary, for many Indians, equal
participation in a global economy represents the ultimate goal towards
which India ought to strive."' Even the marginalized classes, Appadurai
argues, seek to "enter the world of consumption - a world deeply
influenced by real or imagined foreign objects."' Nevertheless, as Vision
Mumbai shows, the imagined future of the city is one in which the
pavement dweller, the slum citizen, and the poor tenant have no visible
place. Like colonial Bombay, the new plans for Mumbai cater to the needs
and desires of the elite.
The cases analyzed in this article illustrate the push factors behind this
marketization of society. Streets need to be cleared to enable more efficient
traffic flows while public space must be freed from "encumbrances" to
make way for private investments and formal infrastructural projects.
Public services, including housing, must move from a paradigm
dominated by rent controls and publically provided worker's chawls to
privately constructed, market value apartments. Meanwhile, inherent in
the drive for privatization is the assumption that markets should be left to
do their work, and consequently, the judiciary should not redistribute land
and housing to the poor through an interpretation of human rights that
SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 43 (A. Durand-
Lasserve & L. Royston eds., 2002).
405. Surya Deva, Globalization and Its Impact on the Realization of Human Rights: Indian
Perspective on a Global Canvas, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 240 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007); see also Brass, supra note
392, at 128.
406. Patel, supra note 3, at 331-32.
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includes a pro-poor right to housing. As an institution of good governance,
the Court continues to take on the unfinished business of the legislative
and executive branches. However, in the State's plan for India as a new,
liberalized, market friendly, global power, the Court's decisions now favor
the business interests of landlords, the spatial reorganizations required by
global firms, the privatization of public services, and the beautification of
the city. It is the changing visions of India's transformation that underpin
the new human rights discourses, and which result in the stripping away
of the human rights protections once guaranteed to the informal settlers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The role of human rights in the struggle for social transformation in
India illustrates how human rights can be exploited in service of radically
divergent and competing visions of society. The contrast between the
housing rights cases, from which emerge a human rights jurisprudence
based on equal and inclusive citizenship, and the recent cases on
environment and development - with their elitist and exclusivist trends -
illustrates that "narratives of human rights are inadequate, even
misleading, without companion narratives of the production of human
rightlessness."4 14 Human rights emerge as a deeply unstable and contested
discourse, given that those responsible for their interpretation "can
redeploy these norms in ways which fundamentally disempower precisely
those groups the norms are intended to benefit." 4 1
Nevertheless, the struggles to control space, housing, and access to the
goods and rights of citizenship now being played out in Mumbai are
testament to the power of human rights. The discourse of human rights
and the practice of human rights claims are potent in a country where the
Constitution's enshrinement of human rights is looked on with pride. The
discourse provides a conceptual and political space in which to lobby,
while legal cases can generate a body of jurisprudence with tangible
effects. But the gains made under human rights can slip away. The Court's
retreat from a pro-poor interpretation of the right to housing and shelter,
and the emergence of newer, more attractive ideals such as the right to
environment and the appeal of the exclusive, "world-class" city illustrate
that battles over the interpretation and control of human rights norms in
the courts are "of necessity . .. episodic (one step forward two steps
backwards)."' However, for the slum and pavement dwellers to abandon
their human rights claims, whether these are pursued through political,
legal or discursive means, is to capitulate to a vision of Mumbai in which
they have become invisible. It is to give in to their erasure and their
disenfranchisement.
Happily, the informal settlers in Mumbai do not represent a backward,
414. Baxi, supra note 278, at 385-88.
415. Rajagopal, supra note 301, at 347.
416. Baxi, supra note 278, at 392.
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passive or victimized mass. They are active in the struggle to transform
their communities, and their use of human rights is creative and dynamic.
Their claim to human rights holds up "powerful images of a cosmopolitan,
secular, multicultural" city in which "the extraordinary courage of
ordinary people" offers the promise for equity and social justice." These
citizens can also "redeploy" human rights in new and creative ways that
can lead to more just and equitable outcomes, even in the face of an
unsympathetic state and judiciary.
The struggle for human rights is never truly won, nor - so long as
human rights are invoked - will it be lost. The housing rights situation in
Mumbai is a striking illustration of the contestation of human rights norms,
and the process of claiming, giving ground, and reclaiming, that
constitutes all social struggles in the name of rights everywhere. Although
human rights can be interpreted in ways that go against just social
transformation, by continuing to engage just discourses of human rights
against unjust and disempowering interpretations, incremental possibilities
for justice, inclusion, social citizenship, and even social transformation,
remain possible.
417. Appadurai, supra note 2, at 650.
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